

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Toward Gestalt Sociology	
CLARENCE M. CASE	3
Abstract or Realistic Sociology	
DAVID SNEDDEN	23
Living Leaders in Scientific Sociology	
DOROTHY HANKINS	37
Culture as Environment	
JESSIE BERNARD	47
Teaching of Introductory Sociology	
MELVIN J. VINCENT	57
Opinions Concerning Mexican Immigrants	
WILLIAM ALBIG	62
Personality and the Genes	
EMORY S. BOGARDUS	73
Book Notes	79
Social Research Notes	80
International Notes	84
Social Fiction Notes	87
Social Photoplay Notes	88

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TOWARD GESTALT SOCIOLOGY

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IN THESE times that "old cast-iron universe," whose joints William James endeavored to loosen up a bit in order "to leave a little room for personal faith," is beginning to show more vulnerable spots than Achilles. While we have not exactly taken it by the heels, it begins to look as if the man of intellectual profession might once more dare to call his soul his own.

The works of Professor Eddington will of course have to be evaluated by those equipped with the conceptual technique of mathematical physics and metaphysics, but the general drift of it for a philosophy of life can be sensed even by a wayfaring man, though a fool, or a sociologist.

The layman more fully realizes the utter abstractness and complete universality of pure science when he reads that in certain physical experiments the observer cannot distinguish past from future, earlier from later. "Time's arrow" has ceased to fly, and the only clue to the future is to follow the trail toward "entropy," which means that "random element which can increase in the universe but can never decrease."¹

The world of becoming seems, for the mathematical physicist, to move in that direction. To our everyday con-

¹ *The Nature of the Physical World*, by A. S. Eddington, Cambridge University, 1928, pp. 74, 99, *et passim*.

sciousness it does likewise, that is to say that Time moves always toward the undetermined future. Eddington, it is true, admits that "entropy" may be a sort of "mind-spinning," but so also, he reflects, is color a mind-spinning. Both seem to possess, nevertheless, a valid reference to objective reality. The one thing of significance for the present discussion is the recognition of a random element in the tightly-riveted universe of an earlier generation of thinkers. The more refined interpretation of it belongs to metaphysics, I suppose, and also to certain aspects of physics.

A noted physicist, winner of the Nobel prize, and presumably competent, strikes a similar note when he stresses the new "principle of uncertainty," growing out of the German Professor Heisenberg's interpretation of discoveries concerning light particles by Professor Compton, at Chicago. In a recent interview the latter is reported² as saying that the Heisenberg-Compton theory "disputed the uniformity of the physical world, which is the basis for the mechanistic view of man's consciousness, and construed an effective intelligence behind the phenomena of nature."

Far from receiving this with mechanistic incredulity, we need constantly to remind ourselves of the logical and epistemological limitations of science itself. Some time ago Professor Vaihinger admonished us that "it must be remembered that the object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality—this would be an utterly impossible task—but to provide us with an *instrument for finding our way about more easily in this world*. Subjective processes of thought inhere in the entire structure of cosmic phenomena."³

² In the *New York Times*, and quoted in *The Literary Digest*, June 21, 1930, p. 16.

³ *The Philosophy of 'As If': A System of the Theoretical, Practical, and Religious Fictions of Mankind*, by H. Vaihinger. Translated by C. K. Ogden. London and New York, 1924, p. 15.

Consciousness being such a practical enterprise as this, designed "to provide us with an *instrument for finding our way about more easily in this world*," it would indicate more philosophical if not more scientific circumspection, to take its reports concerning the nature of reality less unquestioningly. As Vaihinger puts it, "the world of ideas is the fine flower of the whole cosmic process; but for that very reason it is not a copy of it in the ordinary sense. . . . Not even elementary sensations are copies of reality. . . ."⁴

While Vaihinger saw in *sensations* "mere gauges for measuring the changes in reality," Eddington admits that even their refinement in the scientific procedure of physics "is concerned with a world of shadows." This shadow world is perceived largely by mechanical extensions of our visual sense, so that in the end "the whole subject-matter of exact science consists of pointer readings and similar indications. . . . *Something unknown is doing, we don't know what*—that is what our theory amounts to."⁵

Lest it be supposed that this is the extreme view of an isolated thinker, let us note that Bertrand Russell, an authority of comparable eminence, quotes some similar passages from Eddington with approval, and goes on to say that "physics tells us much less about the real world than was formerly supposed," the "laws" of physics "being rather of the nature of logical truisms."⁶

The same movement toward a conception of the world more hospitable toward imagination and faith is strikingly evident in the field of biology, where it takes the form of the new theory called *emergent evolution*. In his address as retiring chairman of the Zoological section of the Ameri-

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 16.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 239, 194, 252, 291 (1929 edition).

⁶ In his article on "Relativity: Philosophical Consequences," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 19: p. 100. Edition of 1929.

can Association for the Advancement of Science, a distinguished biologist sets forth most brilliantly the implications of this recent conception for both science and practical life. In so doing he presents a vivid picture of the doctrine of mechanism against which emergent evolution finds itself in revolt.

According to his account of the older view, "From an examination of any small sample of the universe, at any time, it is possible to discover the laws of action, of grouping, for all its parts, and for all periods. Consequently, after such an examination of the configuration and motions of the particles at any given moment, the clever observer armed with an adequate computing machine could compute and therefore predict the entire course of evolution. . . Evolution is the working of a great machine that never alters its mode of action nor the nature of its product. Science is the examination of what this machine does and produces."⁷

Against this mechanistic portrait, perhaps overdrawn but essentially just, Professor Jennings sets a picture of the world as it appears in the perspective of "emergent" evolution. Regarding the mechanistic conception as "pitiful in its inadequacy," the emergent interpretation "holds that new things, not thus computable, appear as evolution progresses. . . Concretely, it holds that such new things and new modes of action distinguish the living from the non-living, the sentient from the non-sentient, the reasoning from the non-reasoning, the social from the solitary."⁸

These consecutive *levels* of life, characterized by "new methods of action following new laws," make possible,

⁷ "Some Implications of Emergent Evolution," by H. S. Jennings, in *Science*, Jan. 14, 1927, Vol. LXV. Reprinted as a pamphlet (10 cents) by the *Sociological Press*, Hanover, N. H.

⁸ *Ibid.*

even imperative, a measure of autonomy in every science. One by one they are timidly stealing beyond the apron-strings of the physical sciences, whose oppressive domination, perhaps only vaguely felt, is more clearly realized when we hear one of the physical scientists himself confess that "that overweening phase, when it was almost necessary to ask the permission of physics to call one's soul one's own, is past."⁹

As for the *biologist*, Professor Jennings rejoices that "courage and defiance sprout in his soul in place of timid subservience to the inorganic. No longer can the biologist be bullied into suppressing observed results because they are not discovered nor expected from work on the non-living parts of nature."

While many workers in the sociological corner have felt that the intellectual atmosphere was always close, and sometimes stifling, they laid it to the supposedly unalterable intellectual climate of this modern scientific era, and failed to detect the inferiority complex under which their neighbor suffered. But it is none the less heartening to hear that "the doctrine of emergent evolution is the Declaration of Independence for biological science."¹⁰

The struggle for liberty, however, is contagious in the scientific no less than the political realm. So the declaration of the rights of biological science to life, liberty, and the pursuit of truth irresistibly involves the *social* sciences in the emancipation movement. Professor Jennings, with consistency to match his courage, likewise repudiates the leading-strings which earlier biology held over the social sciences, and most appropriately declares that, since "that which is new in principle most conspicuously appears" when the level of the *social* phenomena is reached, "we shall

⁹ A. S. Eddington, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

¹⁰ Cf. Jennings, *ibid.*

be cautious in accepting the advice of even the king of the termites on our own social problems."¹¹

At this point we come squarely upon the position so vigorously defended by Professor Floyd Allport in his article, "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science," and other writings.¹² Leaving to one side for the moment his principal concern, which gives the title to the article quoted above, I refer just here to his accompanying contention that nothing more than "description" is possible within the field of a single given science, while for true "explanation" we are driven to the concepts and principles of the science next below in the scale of complexity. This notion is familiar to the student of Ward's *Pure Sociology* (1903), where it is clearly expounded in his definition of a *principle*, as distinguished from a *law*, of nature. Allport's able formulation of it was met by Professor Goldenweiser¹³ with the rejoinder that such procedure would lead in the end to one single explanation for everything, which explanation must be in physico-chemical terms, since no other facts would remain standing in their own right. Ward had earlier recognized this, and accepted it, being a consistent monist, despite the fact that he very clearly anticipated by a decade or two this new theory of emergent evolution in his brilliant discussion and diagrammation of the "synthetic creations of nature," as he styled them. At each new level, he declared, something really *new* appears.

The position so firmly held by Professor Allport has to be attacked from two angles, namely, that of the logic of science, and that of the nature of phenomena. We witness the logical method of procedure when Dr. Theodore Abel,

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² In the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 29 (May, 1924). Also the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 19 (1924).

¹³ *Ibid.*, in discussing Allport's paper.

in replying to Allport's objections to the *historical* method in ethnology, remarks that "the useful fiction, in Vaihinger's sense, of a closed system of causal factors, effectively counteracts the logical necessity of going *ad infinitum* for a complete causal explanation."¹⁴ This is the true answer on the side of logical method; otherwise all sciences would have to begin with the same data. But if the emergent account of evolution be true the closed system, in a modified sense, is more than a methodological fiction; it is a reflection and necessary consequence of the nature of the world itself, as set out below.

Another distinguished naturalist, Professor C. Floyd Morgan, has recognized this with utmost clearness. "Now one of the cardinal implications," he says, "of emergent treatment is that the richer cannot adequately be interpreted in terms of the poorer; that life cannot be interpreted in terms of physico-chemical relatedness only; that human affairs, which depend upon the quality of the mind, require something more than biological interpretation . . ."¹⁵

The fundamental reason for this is set forth most admirably by Jennings, when he points out that the properties of atoms do indeed depend on those possessed by electrons *when the electrons are in the atom*. Similarly, the properties of molecules depend on those of atoms, *when the atoms are in molecules*. So on up the line through the living things to the *social* plane, where "the activities of societies [depend] on those of their unit individuals when these individuals form part of the society."¹⁶ This is, to be sure, exactly Allport's position as against what he calls "the group fallacy," which he defines as "the error of sub-

¹⁴ See "Is a Cultural Sociology Possible?" by Theodore Abel, in the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 35 (Mar., 1930), p. 751.

¹⁵ *Emergent Evolution*, London, 1923, p. 203.

¹⁶ Jennings, *ibid.*

stituting the group as a whole as a principle of explanation in place of the individuals in the group."¹⁷ But Bogardus replied at the time by showing that the assumption of the "individual" as an entity existing prior to, or independent of, the group, is fallacious; and he pointed out that group-contacts convert the physiological and psychological *individual* into the essentially *social person*.¹⁸

When the *person* appears we are confronted with a new situation, and if one considers that the person possesses both social status and social values it becomes plain that the situation is an irreducibly complicated one. No departmental game of "pass the button" can meet the methodological problem presented to the social sciences. Following Allport, students in this field may go "below" into psychology for explanatory principles, or even, with Spencer, delve deeper still, into biology. But such procedure is really a form of *abstraction*, inasmuch as the investigator draws away from the actual situation that he started out to study. He finds an explanation, but it is the explanation of something else, and something, moreover, not really present. An explanation in psychological terms of the *individual*, even the interacting *individual* if there is any such thing, is not an explanation of the *person*, inseparably intertwined with his *group* and its *culture*. This is the total, or whole, situation that confronts the sociologist. One may turn away from it and seek a neat psychological explanation. The more strictly psychological it becomes the more universal its application and the less it elucidates the concrete and total situation presented by society. As with Alice in Wonderland, the cat has faded away and left only its smile, when one starts out to know a culture-group and ends with only a psychological explanation of it.

¹⁷ *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 29, p. 691.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 703.

The rejoinder may be that Professor Allport does not advocate recourse to general but to social psychology, which by his own definition deals with the *interacting* individuals of the social group. This is good so far as it goes, but does it go far enough? The question is whether the thing we call "society" is not such a total situation, such a *Gestalt* or configuration, such an actual and vitally functioning whole, that it must be understood *as such*, and upon its own *level* as a genuine emergent, without constantly running back to touch home-base in psychology or any other discipline developed through the investigation of a single aspect of the whole, no matter how important, as all will allow the interacting individual, as one aspect, to be.

With respect to Professor Allport's contention, perhaps it should not be overlooked that the soundness of scientific *explanation* is usually held to be reflected in its power to *predict* concerning the phenomena in question. Professor Morgan, writing in another place,¹⁹ refers to the structure of a crystal, and remarks that it may be interpreted as the outcome of "resultant" advance, "or it may be that the crystal cannot be foretold from the molecule, nor the molecule from the atom. If that be so each new mode of organization exemplifies Emergence."

Now in Allport's "explanation" by recourse to psychology do we fall back upon a position from which the social behavior can be foretold with any greater success than upon the social or culture-group level? If so, it would be a very vague and general form of prediction, because knowledge that men will be driven by certain "prepotent reflexes" or any other psycho-physical drives is a very poor guide to the foretelling of the social and cultural forms that

¹⁹ Article on "Emergence," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 8, p. 391. (Edition of 1929).

these will assume in a given social situation. And the more truly the life of the culture-group represents a real emergent the more helpless and irrelevant the psychological explanation in terms of the individual becomes.

Do not these considerations permit us to raise the question whether the theories of emergent evolution and gestalt psychology do not suggest that a method adequate to their object-matter remains yet to be worked out by the social sciences? At any rate, it is interesting to note that the social psychologists themselves have taken the first steps in that direction. Six years ago, in her book, *Creative Experience*, Mary Parker Follett argued: "As we have found that a sensation never exists in experience but is a psychological abstraction, that a "trait" of personality is also a psychological abstraction, so many times our studies reveal to us that the meaning of a social situation is to be found not in its elements viewed separately but only in the total situation, or to use the still more suggestive word of the *Gestalt* school, a *Gesammtsituation*."²⁰ She goes on to say that "it must be remembered that the *Gesammtsituation* cannot be comprehended by thinking of it as a matter of mere interaction." The key to genuine understanding Miss Follett sees in the principle of "integration," which Professor Kimball Young developed earlier in relation to *personality*."²¹

Professor Watson, according to Miss Follett, had declared in 1919 that "the behaviorist is interested in integrations and total activities of the *individual*."²² Social psychologists like herself and Kimball Young are interested in the total situations and integration of *personality*.

²⁰ Mary P. Follett, *Creative Experience*, p. 113.

²¹ See Kimball Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, New York, 1927, p. 207.

²² Italics mine.

Should not sociologists be equally interested in the total situation that has been called "*society*"? It includes at least the person, and the culture, and the *togetherness* of the persons and their culture (including personal attitudes and social values) all together constituting a *whole* which we should perhaps call the *culture-group*, to distinguish it from those cultureless groups of other beings which are nevertheless societies.

The historical school of American ethnologists, notably Professor Lowie and Professor Kroeber, have taken the lead in this direction, as the reader of the current literature in both ethnology and sociology is well aware.²³ The extreme expression of that method in the interpretative principle, "All culture from culture," is doubtless overstated, but its stimulating and far-reaching influence on the social sciences is a fine demonstration of the reward that comes from fearless examination of culture as a total situation existing on its own level.

Let us take a lesson from a neighboring field. Thus in *Gestalt Psychology*, Professor Köhler shows minutely how "the organism reacts to an actual *constellation* of stimuli by a total process which, as a functional whole, is the response to the whole situation."²⁴ In this we see a repudiation of the abstracting, atomizing procedure of the older sensationalist and associational psychology. Have we not reached a place in sociology where a larger grasp of the whole social configuration is to be sought after and welcomed? One finds the biologist C. Lloyd Morgan also speaking in that same *gestalt* terminology: "According to the evidence" . . . he remarks, "color lives *in the whole situation*; in other words, it has being in virtue of the ex-

²³ Cf. especially, *Culture and Ethnology*, by Robert H. Lowie, New York, 1917; and "The Super-Organic," by A. L. Kroeber in the *American Anthropologist*, N. S. vol. 19 (Apr.-June, 1917). Also articles in sociological and anthropological journals.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 106.

trinsic relatedness of person (body-mind) and thing. . . ."²⁵ As for our own sociological "whole situation," there is a rich world of attitudes and values that exists essentially as a total situation whose phenomena have being only by virtue of the extrinsic relatedness of persons, group, and culture. Consequently there is required what one might call a *personal-group-history* method for the purpose of dealing with it. In such a total situation one can no more abstract from either the personal, or the groupal, or the cultural aspect and expect to understand the "society" than he can pull out either the warp or the woof of a piece of cloth and find the fabric itself left. Human social life is a seamless web, in which the personal life-histories of its members form the woof, interwoven in rich complexity of attitude-value pattern with the cultural traditions that constitute the warp. Professor Cooley's suggestion for the study of juvenile delinquency through the consideration of the life-histories of one hundred delinquent boys is an example of this method, while his "organic view" of life is a recognition of the significance of the "whole situation," as opposed to single aspects, as a general principle or method of social research.

We have noted above the fact that behaviorism in psychology very early expressed an interest in the "total activities of the individual," but there are found those among psychologists who do not think that it has succeeded in doing so. On the contrary, so eminent an authority as Köhler seems to think that the behavioristic approach is so narrowly circumscribed that it attributes to mental phenomena a barrenness that is the antithesis of their richness as functioning wholes. In its exclusive preoccupation with the two concepts of positive and negative conditioning the behavioristic method, as Köhler sees it, so impoverishes the

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 229.

object-matter that upon comparison with the world of the physicist "you will find that even physical systems are by far richer in the variety of their kinds of function than is the nervous system of man in the eyes of a radical behaviorist. A soap-bubble does not show us reflexes, it is true, therefore, we cannot expect to find conditioned reflexes in it. Nevertheless, those functional properties which the soap-bubble does exhibit are decidedly superior in some respects to the monotony of reflexes and conditioned reflexes."²⁶

This formidable opponent of behaviorism attributes the "astounding sterility" of the latter in developing productive concepts to a dogmatism so pronounced that one is given to understand that "the truth was revealed to them in its perfection at the birth of behavioristic psychology. . . 'Thou shalt not acknowledge direct experience in science' is the first commandment, and 'Thou shalt not conceive of other functions but reflexes and conditioned reflexes' is the second."²⁷

Of these dogmas, if we may so designate them, the first will concern us later in this discussion, but the second bears directly upon the present issue.

Köhler's indictment, like the inimitable *reductio ad absurdum* by Professor Faris,²⁸ may seem a bit hard on the behaviorists, but since tough-mindedness is one of their special roles, we need not concern ourselves about that. The important consideration just now is that here we seem to see a psychological movement that started out with an expressed interest in "total activities" and ended, if Köhler and other critics are correct, in a point of view notorious for its arbitrary narrowness.

²⁶ Cf. *Gestalt Psychology*, pp. 55-56.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ In "The Subjective Aspect of Culture," by Elwood Faris, in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 19: pp. 37-46.

If such is really the fate of behaviorism it is the outcome of a fundamental flaw in the underlying method with which it set out. Professor Watson has ably illustrated and defended his point of view in various writings,²⁹ holding, as I understand it, that it aims to be nothing more than a method. Concentrating upon objective and physically observable reactions of the individual, it vastly simplifies its problem by ignoring the introspective, subjective aspect of the behavior patterns. But eventually that which was merely ignored comes, with some extremists at least, to be denied, practically if not in theory. Thus that which began, contrary to its own expressed intention, as an abstraction, ends as an "ism," in fact as well as in the name itself. For behaviorism really is an *abstraction* exactly after the fashion of the classical economics of Adam Smith and his followers. Both start out by a gross over-simplification of their object of investigation. Economics, by assuming that all human actions are dictated by egoism and self-interest, created the myth of the "economic man," and in so doing presented what Vaihinger calls "a standard example" of the "abstractive" or "neglective" fiction.³⁰

Behaviorism in its turn adopted a similar fiction, also for methodological purposes, namely, the abstractive fiction of neglecting conscious experience, which is, to be sure, the most difficult aspect of personality to handle, but also the most important. Both classical economics and behavioristic psychology, by taking the easier road in the interest of method, sold the right to serve as an adequate interpretation of their object-matter, and reduced themselves to a fundamental inadequacy despite their many contributions in a smaller way.

²⁹ Cf. his *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, and *The Ways of Behaviorism*.

³⁰ *The Philosophy of 'As If'*, p. 19.

Turning now to the former of the two behavioristic "commandments," as formulated by Köhler, namely, the taboo against acknowledging "direct experience" in science, we are faced with another issue of importance for sociological interpretation. The pronounced tendency of this behavioristic canon to invade sociological thinking and to build up a sort of sociological behaviorism is well known to those familiar with current discussion in our field. In a few moments we shall have to consider the tendency more in detail, but let us first notice the issue in its larger aspect.

In face of the predilection of many persons for a materialistic and mechanistic account of all things, it is significant to hear Professor Lloyd Morgan say, "I shall have occasion hereafter to urge, as against radical behaviorists, that mental guidance of events counts for progress and betokens a kind of relatedness that is effective."³¹ In a later passage, he has the courage, after acknowledging a physical world which is "beyond proof," to add: "I acknowledge also God, Who is, I contend, beyond disproof."³² After asserting further that "ideals of value" are also real in the fullest naturalistic sense under the rubric of relatedness at their own emergent level, he posits an *Activity*, as "omnipresent throughout" the natural world, and suggests that the avenue of approach toward it "in each one of us must be sought in some kind of immediate acquaintance within the current changes of one's own psychical system."³³

The significant phrase in that is its reference to "immediate acquaintance," wherein an eminent scientist sounds not only a religious but even a mystical note. For the other, scarcely less remarkable, admission respecting

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 207-209.

mental causation, Morgan enjoys the support of Professor Jennings, who boldly declares: "Emergent evolution so does away with that monstrous absurdity that has so long been a reproach to biological science; the doctrine that ideas, ideals, purposes have no effect on behavior. The mental determines what happens as does any other determiner."³⁴ The assertion that it does not is, according to Professor Jennings, a purely *a priori* notion, with "no ground based on experimental analysis." This, from a biologist eminent among experimentalists, one sees supported by a physicist, likewise famed for experimental research, when Professor Compton finds in his exploration of the physical world room for "a certain freedom of choice" and the corollary that "one's thoughts are not the result of molecular reactions obeying fixed physical laws."³⁵

This brings us to an issue which is of major importance to the theme of the present paper; and that is the question as to what kinds of evidence sociologists are going to welcome in their effort to understand social phenomena. Professor Köhler, in discussing certain problems of psychology aroused by the organism's total response to a constellation of stimuli, uses a happy and significant phrase when, as one way out of the psychologist's dilemma, he suggests a determination to "*trust all kinds of experience impartially*."³⁶ Whatever may be the response of psychologists to such a challenge, does it call for a scientific and philosophical catholicity that sociologists are prepared to exercise at this stage? As I take it, Professor Hornell Hart was pleading for intellectual hospitality of that sort in his paper on "Mana, Magic, and Animism in Modern Religion," read before the American Sociological Society at its

³⁴ *Emergent Evolution*, loc. cit.

³⁵ *Op. cit.*

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

last annual session.³⁷ In the haste and confusion of such a huge gathering this issue was not squarely met, but it would be interesting to know what the response of the sociological fraternity at large would be.

No one needs to be told that sociology has been shifting its center of interest overwhelmingly toward research, and the development of the technique of research, for the last decade at least. In so doing the influence of physical science and its method has been almost everywhere dominant, with consequent emphasis upon minute analysis, quantitative measurement, and statistical manipulation. To a large degree these procedures have been taken over from psychology, but since that science has become, in some of its aspects, almost a division of physics, it amounts to the same thing in the end. For this reason the trenchant criticisms directed against current psychology by Köhler will be found equally true and timely if applied to sociology without the change of a single word. "If we wish to imitate the physical sciences, we must not imitate them in their contemporary, most developed form; we must imitate them in their historical youth, when their state of development was comparable to our own at the present time. Otherwise we should behave like boys who try to copy the imposing manners of full-grown men without understanding their *raison d'être*, also without seeing that in development one cannot jump over intermediate and preliminary phases. . . . Let us imitate the natural sciences, but intelligently!"³⁸

In the early stages of any science certainly, and perhaps during all of its history except the latest stage qualitative observation will vastly overshadow quantitative measurement. Indeed the qualitative procedure is the necessary

³⁷ At Washington, D.C., December, 1929.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 42-44.

pre-condition of the measuring method, and it alone can give the investigator an intelligent notion as to what he is measuring and why he measures it. Now it would be not only ungracious but narrow-minded to withhold hearty approval of the many fine pieces of social research that have piled up to the credit of this more recent sociological movement. Moreover, the attitude behind it is indispensable for the continued progress of the social sciences. Yet at the same time, who has failed to note that we are producing all too many "projects" that not only shed no light on the "socio-historical actuality," but betray themselves as nothing but an occasion for statistical acrobatics? One recalls a wise Graduate Dean's remark, that a "doctoral dissertation is supposed to be a contribution, but usually turns out to be an exercise."

Referring to what he regards as Fechner's premature attempt to found experimental psychology by "copying adult physics," Köhler remarks that Fechner "seems to have been convinced that measuring in itself would make a science out of psychology." Psychology did indeed arise about that time, but according to Köhler it could do so only because the necessary qualitative knowledge had accumulated, in various ways, to serve as a basis, upon which the science arose "rather casually." But in consequence of the uncritical disposition to copy the quantitative methods of mature physics, we have in consequence, within psychological and especially educational, circles, a situation where "hundreds of thousands of quantitative psychophysical experiments have been made almost in vain, because no one knew just what he was measuring or what were the processes upon which the whole procedure was built."³⁹ The reader who will note the broken-down research projects that are left strewn along the critical trail

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

of Sorokin in *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, or Thomas in *The Child in America*, will be impressed with the truth of this statement.

There are two tendencies in the human mind, present in varying balance in all persons, and expressing themselves in the great intellectual organizations called arts, sciences, and philosophies. One disposition or tendency is to split phenomena up into smaller and smaller units in order to observe, compare, and measure, more minutely and more exactly. This is the procedure called *science*, and it yields a vast amount of definite and useful knowledge, but leaves us a dissected and raveled-out world. For this reason its steady advance has oftentimes made for an illumination of the intellect and a darkening of the spirit in modern times. Men asked science for bread and it gave them bread, although the bread proved oftentimes virtually a stone.

While many have thus come to heavy-hearted grief in their philosophy of life, a vast multitude have not. The reason is that there is an equally persistent tendency in man to build knowledge and dreams into wholes and to live in the presence and shelter of them. These are the great synthetic creations of art, philosophy, and religion. Each of these moves from diversity toward an inclusive unity. In the works of *art* we attain the esthetic unity of a single symphony, poem, painting, or temple; a single thing of beauty that is grasped as a whole if grasped at all. In *philosophy* the unifying power inheres in a few comprehensive and logically related concepts which marshall in vast perspective a multitude of facts and ideas. By means of *religion* another great synthesis is attained, drawing upon both art (in ritual) and philosophy (as theology), and producing, with the support of both intellect and emotion, a sense of unification of the will of the worshipper with the absolute will. While the remorseless analytical probing

and dissecting of the scientific tendency has driven some to cynicism and despair, these great synthesizing movements, within the same culture and the same persons, have renewed in men the will and the joy to live. Neither of these drives, the one toward analysis, the other toward synthesis, has been or will be completely crowded out by the other, because both, as I see it, are permanent, as perpetually recurring phases of every normal and developed personality.

Art, philosophy, and religion are thus equally valid along with science in the pragmatic sense that they help men to live. Perhaps no one would dispute this, but are we ready to go further and say that they are also all equally valid as sources of truth concerning life and the world? The answer, I suppose, will be governed by the degree of naïve and unquestioning credence one places in those "pointer-readings" on a dial which physical science wrings from that "world of shadows" about which we spoke at the outset. Moreover, one's position will be further affected by his philosophy of nature, particularly whether he is living in a world where unvarying mechanical forces pursue their predetermined course along the path of unilinear evolution, or in the less determined, creative, more free, surprising and spiritual world of emergent and even creative evolution.

If sociology, applying behavioristic methods, elects to stress only the objective and measurable phenomena, it will share the fate of its mentor, in that, while always hard on the trail, and a master of footprints, it may never catch up with the quarry. In so far as this comes true it may be explained by the fact that while living forms occupy *space*, *life* itself, as experience, does not, but endures through *time*. Using these terms in a somewhat common-sense way, I think it is true that the real zest and tang of

personal and group life inheres in what we call "experience." Experience, as I am using the term, means the events that a living being goes through in the course of time, insofar as these are stored up in memory and elaborated by consciousness into personal purposes and social values. "Meaning," in this subjective, conscious, purposeful sense is the central fact in the life of the individual, the person, and the group. This being true, what are the implications for sociological method?

For one thing, it implies that the sociological student will have to "trust all kinds of experience, impartially," and that includes subjective experience. A bent for "measuring," as contrasted with evaluating in the qualitative sense, naturally leads to emphasis upon physical aspects because they alone are spatial. But the meaning and significance lies not in the spatial, but in the time dimension. If we try to "measure" time we end with the intervals marked off on a clock-face, as Bergson, I believe, points out. The projected time-interval has to be measured as a space-interval, in other words not measured at all, in its essential aspect of *experience*. Here again we get pointer-readings on a dial, but not much of the meaning of true duration is registered by the clock.

I am aware that those competent in that field are saying that the older contrast between space and time is robbed of validity by the discoveries of Einstein and others respecting relativity, the two being merged into "space-time." But I make no pretension to more than a common-sense use of the words here.

It is not only in the field of physics and philosophy that one runs the risk of mistake. In the sociological field also things are not always what they seem at first glance. This is exemplified in the case of three methodological concepts, the first two of these just now much used in social research,

namely, "social distance," "human ecology," and "sociology of religion." Let us examine each of these from the present point of view, in order to see whether, in these instances, research is being directed toward the spatial externals or the essential meaning of collective life.

In "*social distance*" we have an expression which is spatial, in its substantive term, more completely than any other word used by sociologists, if we except certain ecological terminology. Yet those who have done most to define, refine, and measure it, as Simmel, Park, and Bogardus, agree in using the term to signify not extent of separation in space (although it may take the form of physical withdrawal at times), but degree of understanding and sympathy between persons. It is therefore, as Professor Hayes remarked,⁴⁰ a figurative term, which renders it none the less useful, to say the least.

In this case, while the language of physical relation and measurement is used, and very effectively, we see that it is in its essence an effort to gauge and register the form and degree of certain kinds of personal and group *experience*.

The *ecological* movement in sociology might seem at first glance to be a dubious attempt at social physics, with its spatially flavored concepts of concentration, centralization, segregation, natural areas, and regional aspects in general. Preoccupation with such things might be expected to lead the sociologist into an abstracting, analyzing dissection of the physical forms of community existence, in a kind of sociological behaviorism that would possibly obscure the real meaning of the life lived through them. Yet, on the contrary, we find Professor House showing⁴¹ how the whole tendency from Brunhes through Mackenzie

⁴⁰ "Representative Concepts in Sociology," by Edward C. Hayes, in *Sociology and Social Research*, XII:12-17.

⁴¹ See the admirable chapter on "Natural Areas," in *The Range of Social Theory*, by Floyd N. House, New York, 1929.

to Mukerjee has been quite the reverse of atomistic. On the contrary, it has aimed at an intensive study of *concrete wholes* of human life with much of that attention to the "total situation" which I venture to call gestalt sociology.

In the field of the *sociology of religion* we see the significance of a method that seeks to comprehend the entire configuration, especially upon its subjective side. Otherwise one returns with empty shells of behavior patterns from which the vital meaning has vanished, as at an alien touch. So true is this in the present instance that, if the ecological and statistical approaches are the only ones available, no true sociology of religion need be expected. In directing some student researches in this field at the University of Southern California I have been impressed with the necessity of the method which Professor Lindeman happily styled "the participant observer."⁴² Experience in this field, however, suggests the need of something even more intimate which might be called the method of the observing participant. In a word, no one really knows what the attitudes and values of a religious fellowship or communion actually are until he senses their *meaning*, and he can get the full tang and pungency of that only by participation, either with the aid of the "sympathetic imagination" of Cooley, which serves as an incentive in the case of the participant observer, or by dependance upon the scientific detachment and criticism of a cooperating research group, which provides the necessary corrective, in the case of the observing but naturally biased participant. Let us illustrate this by reference to a recent study that has attracted much favorable attention.

In their study of "Middletown," as a typical American community,⁴³ Robert and Helen Lynd have applied the ob-

⁴² Cf. *Social Discovery*, by Eduard C. Lindeman, New York, 1924.

⁴³ *Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture*, by Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, New York, 1929.

jective, ethnological approach, through description of culture patterns, with notable success. Yet to one whose early life was spent in a neighboring community identical in character, and enjoying active participation in its religious life, their vivid portrayal of the behavioristic side of the Sunday School, prayer meeting, and other gatherings in the churches there, struck me as empty and misleading, just because it so perfectly described simply the religious activities from their outer and relatively meaningless side.

Happily the authors themselves realized this and fitly remark:

"These bald statements, set down as accurate descriptions of what a person going to church and Sunday School in Middletown sees and hears, cannot adequately represent the all-important consideration of what these services mean to the Middletown people themselves."⁴⁴

This recognized failure of the objective culture-pattern method to interpret the religious group presents a foretaste of the barrenness that may be expected from such a sociological behaviorism as might conceivably develop if certain tendencies now working should gain the ascendancy. Not as a substitute, but as a corollary, I suggest *gestalt* sociology, among whose characteristics may be named the following:

It will bear in mind the essentially symbolic and abstract unreality of the formulations of even the most exact sciences. Mechanistic determinism will not remain a sacred tenet of its philosophy, and it will have room for the surprising freshness of conception that characterizes the theories of emergent evolution. As corollaries to this, *gestalt* sociology will set out boldly to describe and explain the life of human culture-groups as presenting a new and autonomous level of phenomena. In so doing it will avoid

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 390.

the abstracting fictions of behaviorism and endeavor to grasp the total situation, the complete configuration of human society. Using where helpful the spatial concepts and measurements of physical science and human ecology, it will go above and beyond them into the study of experience in the subjective conscious sense of meaning and values. This will require it to trust all kinds of experience impartially. What is lost in mathematical exactness may thus be more than made up in sociological insight. There will be analysis in all its work, but still more of synthesis in the end.

Perhaps the reason why artists and poets have often the profounder insight, as compared with scientists and even philosophers, is because they "see life steadily, and see it whole."

ABSTRACT OR REALISTIC SOCIOLOGY?

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IN REVIEWING a recent work on "Trends in American Sociology," Professor E. B. Reuter says:

There is a good deal of insistence throughout the book on the conception of sociology as a natural science. Such a conception assumes the existence of a group of natural processes which it is the business of sociology to isolate and define. But the division of sociology on the traditional basis is a virtual denial of the existence of the processes elsewhere assumed. On a scientific level, there is no more reason for dividing sociology into "urban," "rural," "educational," and the like, than there is for so dividing mathematics, chemistry, or biology. Once such a basis is assumed, there is no logical reason for restricting the divisions to six or ten. If there is to be a "rural" and an "urban" sociology, there should certainly also be a "suburban" sociology and perhaps also a "village" and a "metropolitan" sociology. If there is an "educational" sociology, there should also be a "political," "religious," and "hedonistic" sociology, and probably also a "Catholic," "Presbyterian," "aviation," and "boot-leg" sociology.

The traditional divisions of sociology are understandable and are perhaps administratively expedient. Logically they are absurd. The teacher, as the research student, must ignore such divisions unless he is content to operate along unprofitable lines. The scholar who undertakes to trace scientific trends must choose between things traditional and things fundamental.¹

The issue thus suggested by Professor Reuter seems to the present writer of fundamental importance to the promotion of sociological studies in the collegiate and secondary schools of America during the next few decades.

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1930, p. 143.

Let us grant his contention as it relates to "the scholar" in sociology. But there are certainly tens of thousands of students now in college classrooms who are vaguely interested in things sociological and who, under concrete and incisive teaching, can be made keenly and intelligently interested, not so much in the far-reaching abstractions of sociology as in the realistic restriction and application of these to social situations lying well within regions of his fairly first hand experience.

The issues here suggested were discussed at some length at an organization meeting of persons interested in sociology, held in Providence, May 2-3, 1930. The present writer held, that just as many of the useful applications and not a little of the progress, of chemistry have been realized through such differentiations as food chemistry, steel-making chemistry, and soil chemistry, so the future usefulness as well as popular support of sociology may be expected to be realized largely through focusing the attention of all but the most synoptic of minds upon specific areas. The following contentions were presented in somewhat digested form:

SOME BASIC HYPOTHESES AS TO SUBDIVIDING AND
PRESENTING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES FOR VARIOUS
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES

By those well-informed persons who think that more effective and more democratic cooperations among myriads of peoples can only be achieved through widespread and greatly improved educations in the social sciences, the following propositions may well be accepted as *postulates*. But it is certain that to the great majority of even well-informed Americans they will seem rather to be *hypotheses* of novel character and doubtful validity. The writer submits them on this occasion, then, as supremely important

hypotheses of great moment to the better cultural and civic educations of the future, and especially as providing guidance towards sound discrimination of educational values and towards the shaping of serviceable pedagogical objectives:

1. For purposes of organizing the *generalizing* (that is, the non-historical) social sciences for educational purposes, it is now logical, and will become increasingly expedient, to regard sociology as, analogously with psychology, biology, chemistry and physics, an inclusive or parent science having numerous progeny social sciences.

2. Hence: just as the biology of the internal functionings of organisms gives physiology; the biology of micro-organic plants, bacteriology; the biology of trees dendrology; and the like, so it can serviceably be held that the sociology of *political* societies give *political* science (or politics); the sociology of the *wealth* getting and exchanging activities of men gives *economics*; the sociology of *family* life gives (shall we say?) *familistics*; whilst (as things are at present) the sociology of primitive life (and especially its cultural aspects) gives anthropology.

3. And, since large proportions of the "takings" from the social sciences to be used in enriching and making more functional school educations from the primary grades through the liberal college will especially emphasize those *applications* which promise to function fairly directly towards increasing human well being, it may well prove expedient, starting with such an inclusive term as "eudemics" (to comprehend the "useful arts and sciences" contributions of sociology) to keep constantly in view such divisional sections of eudemics as eugenics and civics, politics and economics, and a score of others not yet named (some to replace the vague "ethics" of the philosophers). ("By adopting eugenics and civics into his scheme of studies, the

sociologist has, more than before, a concrete basis and a definite objective as well as an orderly method, on which to invite (or demand) the full contributory cooperation of the cultivators of the preliminary sciences, biological, and physical, who have hitherto, as a body, held coldly aloof from him," says Victor Branford of the (British) Sociological Society.)

4. In fact it will prove pedagogically most important to keep constantly before immature learners notions and examples of *special* or *departmental* sociologies and eudemics (as practical workers everywhere study the physics of soil-drying, the chemistry of steel-making, the biology of wound-infection, the psychology of business panics, etc.). Examples like the following should in hundreds be kept constantly before young students, always with especial reference either to their "wonder arousing and satisfying" possibilities; or their current "eudemic problem" aspects:

- a. Sociology of (sociological aspects of) hobo life in southwestern United States.
- b. Eudemics of community chest relief.
- c. Sociology of conjugal life in no-child families.
- d. Sociological disturbances among Indians under impact of civilization, and when so deprived of free hunting grounds.
- e. Eudemics of installment buying among Americans.
- f. Sociology of children's societies (of ages less than 14) found under school conditions.
- g. Eudemic effects of private school education.
- h. Sociology of recent immigrant family life (Italian).
- i. Sociological consequences of chain store distribution.
- j. Eugenic effects (a division of eudemics) of devotion to the American eleventh commandment "thou shalt rise higher than thy father."
- k. (Political) sociology of tariffs for protection.
- l. (Civic) sociology of "bloc" formations.
- m. (Economic) sociology of corporation agriculture.
- n. (Ecological) sociology of generations of residence on dissected plateaus of the south Appalachian type.

o. (Eudemic) or "familistic" sociology of police-regulated prostitution.

p. Sociology of urban "smart sets."

q. (And hundreds of others).

5. This method of approach will naturally point the way to those special sociologies or specializations of sociology which, along with takings from the psychological, physiological, and even geological, meteorological, and historical sciences, will increasingly be assembled and organized by workers seeking scientific guidance in large fields of human work. For example:

a. Educational sociology of school-platoon and school-class management.

b. Sociology of crime inductions (or early stages).

c. Sociology of neurasthenic women (perhaps of more "cultured" types).

d. Sociology of personnel employment in large factories (with especial sections for immigrant women, girls, seasonal workers, etc.).

e. Sociology of large scale cooperative marketing by farmers (perhaps differentiated for producers of highly localized products, e.g., oranges, and large-area products, e.g., wheat).

f. Educational sociology of large-school administration in cities (where buildings have 2,000-4,000 pupils).

g. Educational sociological aspects of celibate women teachers after age 40 (perhaps differentiated as rural and urban).

h. Criminal sociology of long-term prison detentions (perhaps separate consideration for "lifers").

i. Educational sociology of juvenile reform school educations (differentiated by sexes, at least).

j. (Rural sociological) present-day effects of the radio (perhaps differentiated in accordance with much remoteness or much nearness to fairly large cities).

k. (Urban sociological) effects of old homes or land held for approaching uses for business (separately considering these as refuges for recent immigrants or "native stock" "ne'er-do-wells."

l. Dependency sociology of single young men unemployables (and as between east and west).

m. Educational sociology of herd-mindedness among adolescent girls (perhaps largely a new type of social group due to security of cities).

n. Religious sociology of "young people"—and especially "post-war" intellectuals.

o. (And hundreds of others)

6. The specific eudemic or social values to be sought by educations obviously number tens of thousands. Educational science is now striving to discover "genus"-like, "species"-like, and other fairly homogeneous groupings or classifications of these, to the end that something of system, orderliness, and efficiency may be brought into the administrative and pedagogical use of educative means for realization of such eudemic values.

Some advantages are now being realized by the assembling of thousands of specific eudemic values (and from these, to similar classes of educational values) into four great divisions: physical welfare values (health-conserving, body-growth promoting, disease prevention, etc.); vocational proficiency values (competencies, thrifts, satisfactions in pursuit of an economic productive calling for support of self and dependents); social cooperation values (decencies, moralities, civic superiorities, helpful religious beliefs, etc.); and cultural enhancement values (especially superior utilizing powers towards the better things of the social inheritance, and excluding for present purposes, the more "utilitarian" utilizations, as having been and included in the three previous divisions).

By reference to such groupings of social values it is here contended: that the social science studies can be expected to contribute very slightly if at all to the *physical welfare* values; that only a very few and very much specialized takings from them will probably contribute to proficiencies in the great majority of vocations (whilst probably for

such professions as theology, public health, nursing, law, and educational administration and for a few lesser vocations—possibly hotel clerks, drug sellers, factory foremen, employment agents, and some others, the useful takings from social science studies may prove fairly extensive); that these studies should yield an enormous range of valuable contributions to the making of political citizens, these being conceived primarily as cooperators in the collective enterprises of evolving and sustaining good governments; and that also the social sciences should contribute extensively to those cultural values which consist largely of persistent interests in the higher things of “the spirit”—that is, of intellectual and aesthetic appreciations.

SOME HYPOTHESES FOR PROMOTERS OF EDUCATIONAL USES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES

Teachers and researchers in the generalizing social sciences will presumably be among the first to comprehend the very wide range of educational values (good things, things of worth) to be derived from such sciences, and especially as contributing to the better civic and better cultural educations in schools of the future for young Americans from 12 to 24 years of age.

Unfortunately, large proportions of college instructors in sociology and the other social sciences seem as yet to be only slightly interested in the more pedagogical problems involved in making these studies as popular and visibly functional as they deserve to be. Like large proportions of their brethren in the natural sciences, historical, literary, linguistic and other collegiate studies, most sociologists (and especially the young, “Ph. D.—specialized” varieties), will probably try nearly all *wrong* ways, before purposefully seeking for the more nearly *right* ways of promoting their subjects. Especially will they, in spite of their

vast influence, prove poor guides for the development of social science studies for the secondary schools.

For all these the following hypotheses are submitted, perhaps in a bit of challenging spirit, as representing advanced *pedagogical* principles:

1. For the great majority of learners at secondary and collegiate school levels the most effective organizations of social science subject matter will not follow so-called "logical" orders—which will commonly seem the orders of greatest simplicity and maximum effectiveness to scholarly adult minds.

In lieu of "logical orders" of organizations of subject matter, numberless so-called "psychological" and "pedagogical" organizations are possible, some good, some silly, and some futile. Only painstaking study of learners and of achievements by learners will eventually enable us to determine the best.

2. Hence this further thesis: "Outline" courses, "general introduction" courses, "principles" courses, all tend to have for beginning students—at any age, from 13 to 23—the vices of: excessive *logical organization*, instead of *psychological organization*; excessive use of *deductive generalizations* instead of *inductively derived findings*; excessive *numbers* of abstract generalizations, instead of fewer of more tangible importance; excessive *a priorism* of findings; poverty of "case" treatments of case-situations; too great "omnibus" generalizations of terminology—e.g., "the rural problem," "the problem of family life in America" (are there not at least 500 concrete types of problems, no ten at all like each other?) and the like.

3. Closely allied to the foregoing theses is this: In all early stages of instruction in the social sciences reference should rarely be made to "society." Instead, constant use should be made of references to such concrete "societies" as school classes, families, cities, gangs, religious denominations, girls' cliques, trade union locals, the buyers and sellers each day in a department store, homemaker and employed servant, nations and the like.

The term "society," like such terms as "matter," "energy," and "space," denotes very little that is real to younger students, and connotes even less that is significant to them. But "a society," "societies," "social groups," "the American public," "our own set," and the like are fairly realistic.

4. Of even more importance: the expected "functionings," not only of comprehensive social science courses or subjects, but also of the particular divisions, topics or themes of which they are composed, will have to be increasingly matters of proven knowledge rather than of faith—as are increasingly the "functional" potentialities of medicines, fertilizers, engineering materials, and the like in other fields of work.

For example: the production of superior civic traits—of ideal, attitude and valuation, of insight and dependable belief, of skills and habitual practices—in the millions who in our political democracies—urban, provincial, federal—are expected to share cooperatively in conserving social order, and in advancing political efficiencies becomes ever a more urgent task for educators as the political cooperations of societies become more complex and, in a sense, precarious.

Toward producing these superior civic powers and appreciations some "takings" from the social sciences, serviced (methods of presentation) in particular ways, and these takings only, will doubtless prove useful for minds of less than median intelligence; whilst quite others are practicable for youths in the highest fourth in intelligence.

In general: takings from the social science studies will have to vary greatly in content and methods of treatment according as to whether they are to be submitted to learners at fourteen or at eighteen years of age; according as they are expected to function as fine civic ideals or as very practical knowledge based on insights; and according as they are addressed primarily to prospective citizens of urban or of rural ecological conditions.

5. And a final example: Surely the social sciences are destined to become increasingly the sources of those exalted cultural values which former generations called "humanistic" and which, in the absence of sociology, they sought in the ancient literatures, the Grecian philosophies, the law code of Rome, the aesthetic arts also of ancient peoples, and the like.

But if the social sciences are to serve as splendid sources of these loftier cultures, much study will have to be given by educators to the portions which, for particular classes of learners, will probably most function to these ends, and also to the much needed "servicing" of such offerings with qualities of literary style, vivid appreciative adaptation, and the like.

LIVING LEADERS IN SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY

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WHAT sociologists are contributing most in volume to current sociological literature? Which of these are most frequently quoted by their fellow sociologists? Which of them are doing work of a scientific calibre most deserving of attention? Two years ago Dr. Hornell Hart and some of his students at Bryn Mawr College published the results of an attempt to determine the consensus of opinion as to the relative importance of the contributions to social thought of historic social thinkers.¹ The rating of living sociologists is certainly more difficult and perhaps more dangerous, but it is an interesting problem, and it is what this study, in a tentative way, undertakes.

Anyone who reads the sociological journals gradually becomes familiar with names of certain contributors, and forms a general impression as to who are the important men in the field. The first step in our procedure was to replace this general impression by definite information as to the actual number of people contributing to representative journals over a period of time, together with the number of articles contributed.

The journals chosen were: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, volume 133 through volume 144—from September, 1927, through June, 1929; *American Journal of Sociology*, volumes 33 and 34—from July, 1927, through May, 1929; *Sociology and Social Research*, volumes 12 and 13—from July, 1927,

¹ Hornell Hart and others, *Social Forces*, vol. 6, pp. 190-6, Dec., 1927.

through May, 1929; *Social Forces*, volumes 6 and 7; and the *Publications of the American Sociological Society* from 1925 through 1929. It was thought that some of the work of anyone who is affecting sociological thinking would have appeared in one or more of these journals within the period stated.

Examination of these journals showed that there had been a total of 734 articles written by a total of 497 different persons.

TABLE I

<i>No. of Articles</i>	<i>No. of Writers</i>	<i>Writers x Articles</i>
1	387	387
2	58	116
3	21	63
4	15	60
5	4	20
6	4	24
7	5	35
8	1	8
9	1	9
12	1	12
<hr/> TOTAL	<hr/> 497	<hr/> 734

From the above table it can be seen that approximately 78 per cent of the contributors had only one article published and that these single articles constitute a little more than half of the total. Fifty-eight persons contributed two articles each and fifty-two, three or more.

For the purpose of this study the persons who had written only one article were eliminated and a list was made of the remaining one hundred and ten. However, it is manifestly unfair to judge a thinker merely by the number of articles he has written within a given time, so the next step was to find out which men are considered important by their fellow sociologists. To get at this matter the indexes of twelve modern textbooks were studied. They are: (1) Anderson and Lindeman, *Urban Sociology*; (2) Beach,

Introduction to Sociology; (3) Case, *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*; (4) Davis, Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*; (5) Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress*; (6) Groves, *An Introduction to Sociology*; (7) Hart, *Science of Social Relations*; (8) Lumley, *Principles of Sociology*; (9) Odum and Jocher, *Introduction to Social Research*; (10) Palmer, *Field Studies in Sociology*; (11) Wallis, *An Introduction to Sociology*, and (12) Wallis, *An Introduction to Anthropology*. These were chosen as being fairly representative and also as sufficient in number to make the results worthwhile.

A record was made of every person whose name appeared in an index together with the number of references to him, and ten references was taken as the minimum requirement for inclusion in a list made up from this material.

As a preliminary to the third step in the study, a combined list was made of all persons who had written two or more articles, had been referred to ten or more times, or had received both distinctions. These 148 persons were then looked up in the Book Index² and a record made of all books and pamphlets they had published during the past eleven years—that is, from 1919 through 1929. Due to the amount of work necessary in producing a scientific, scholarly book, any shorter period would probably be too brief to give an adequate picture of the amount of writing any particular man is doing. On the other hand, any longer period might put an undue emphasis upon those who have not contributed recently.

As the published material consisted of books by a single author, books by two or more authors, pamphlets written alone or in collaboration with others, and books which had

² *The United States Catalog—Books in Print January 1, 1928*, together with the supplements up to date. H. W. Wilson Company.

been edited where the editing involved creative work, the question arose as to how any sort of comparison could be made. To meet this problem the following scheme of weighting was used:

	<i>Points Allowed</i>
Books written alone.....	5
Books written with others.....	2
Pamphlets	1
Articles	1
Books edited	1

Thus each of the 148 persons on our list received a score based upon the types of his published works and upon their number.

The next thing in order was the elimination of some of these 148 men by setting a minimum score on writings and a minimum number of references to determine the names which should make up our final list. Ten points was set as the minimum score on publications, but it was more difficult to settle the matter of references. It would seem that twelve references by two people are generally indicative of more influence than fifteen references by one person, and it was necessary to take account of this fact. Accordingly it was decided that the minimum should be a total of ten references by at least three people.

There were 40 people who met both requirements. You will notice, however, that the table below contains 45 names. Five persons were included for special reasons—Groves, because his score of 55 indicates that he is an unusually prolific writer and it seemed well to examine some of his work; House, Park, and Thomas, who had unusually numerous references and who were only one point below the minimum score; and finally, Rice, because his more-than-minimum score, based on three articles and two books and his seventeen references by two people, put him closer to the ones on the list than to the ones who were eliminated.

TABLE II³

	<i>References</i>	<i>Number of Persons Citing</i>	<i>Amount of Publications</i>
Allport, F. H.	21	7	16
Barnes, H. E.	41	6	67
Bernard, L. L.	30	5	18
Blackmar, F. W.	13	4	10
Boas, Franz	23	6	13
Bogardus, E. S.	40	7	63
Burgess, E. W.	92	8	14
Carver, T. N.	13	4	42
Case, C. M.	24	5	17
Chapin, F. S.	29	6	20
Chase, Stuart	14	4	20
Commons, J. R.	26	3	19
Davis, Jerome	15	4	21
Dewey, John	19	5	48
Ellwood, C. A.	37	5	40
Elmer, M. C.	13	3	19
Frazer, Sir James	16	6	20
Giddings, F. H.	78	11	17
Gillin, J. L.	21	7	17
Goldenweiser, A. A.	59	5	10
Groves, E. R.	00	0	55
Hankins, F. C.	19	5	13
Hart, Hornell	18	4	18
House, F. N.	25	3	9
Keith, Sir Arthur	12	5	26
Keller, A. G.	37	4	12
Kroeber, A. L.	27	5	34
Lindeman, E. C.	14	4	21
Lowie, R. H.	30	6	32
McDougall, William	17	7	57
McIver, R. M.	11	4	10
Merriam, C. E.	13	4	35
Odum, H. W.	12	4	34
Ogburn, W. F.	67	7	19
Park, R. E.	80	8	9

³ The persons meeting one requirement but not the other were: R. L. Buell, Niles Carpenter, J. B. Chamberlain, J. Q. Dealey, R. T. Ely, Mary P. Follett, C. L. Fry, J. M. Gillette, H. F. Gosnell, A. E. Holt, Harry Jerome, H. H. Lasswell, J. P. Lightenberger, R. D. McKenzie, H. H. Moore, E. R. Mowrer, R. Mukerjee, K. Pearson, E. B. Reuter, Dwight Sanderson, O. Spengler, J. F. Steiner, B. J. Stern, C. C. Taylor, A. J. Todd, W. D. Wallis, and Kimball Young.

C. H. Cooley and L. T. Hobhouse met both requirements but at this is a list of living sociologists, they were not included.

	References	Number of Persons Citing	Amount of Publications
Rice, S. A.	17	2	13
Ross, E. A.	86	9	49
Russell, Bertrand	15	5	68
Smith, G. Elliot	11	3	20
Sorokin, Pitirim	34	3	28
Thomas, W. I.	57	10	9
Watson, J. B.	17	6	19
Wissler, Clark	38	8	28
Znaniecki, Florian	16	4	12

Of the men in this group the following fourteen were listed in "History of Social Thought,"⁴ with the ratings given. It is interesting to compare the two sets of ratings.

Consensus Points		References	Number of Persons Citing	Consensus Points		References	Number of Persons Citing
19	Ross	86	9	4	Park	80	8
18	Giddings	78	11	3	Lowie	30	6
7	Thomas	51	10	3	Goldenweiser	59	5
7	Ellwood	37	5	2	Gillin	21	7
5	McDougall	17	7	2	Kroeber	27	5
5	Dewey	19	5	2	Wissler	38	8
4	Boas	26	6	2	Znaniecki	16	4

One of the most noticeable things about the group of 45 is the conspicuous absence of women. Of the 497 writers in Table I, 50 are women and the shorter list of 148 writers contains the name of 6 women but these six were eliminated by the minimum requirements for inclusion in the final list. This, of course, does not justify the conclusion that no women are making sociological studies or doing sociological thinking, but it does make apparent that the results of such studies and thinking are not finding their way into the sociological journals and that so far little attention is paid to them in sociology textbooks.

⁴ Hornell Hart and others, *Social Forces*, vol. 6, Dec., 1927, pp. 195-6.

It is an interesting commentary on sociology that such men as Dewey, McDougall, Russell, and Watson, who are not sociologists, rank very high on the list. Also, sixteen of the men—that is 35 per cent—are not members of the American Sociological Society and that in spite of the fact that the use of the *Publications and Proceedings* and of the *American Sociological Journal* might lead us to expect the members of the society to receive, if anything, undue emphasis. Of these sixteen, only three do not make their home in this country.

This study does not attempt to answer the question of ultimate significance of the work of the men listed. The reference test is probably the best way we have of getting at what appears to be significant at present, but only the future can determine the ultimate importance of a man's contribution. The writer believes, however, that it is possible to rank these sociologists according to the extent to which their work is the result of analysis of scientific data rather than merely an expression of opinion.

The following⁵ is a tentative scheme of rating for this purpose worked out by Hornell Hart with his students:

The Rating Device. Study carefully the article or chapter to be rated. Decide into or between which of the following classes it falls, and apply the appropriate basic rating. If it fulfills most of the conditions for a given class, but falls short in a few respects, give it the rating of that class, minus one to five points:

TYPES OF SOCIOLOGICAL ARTICLES	Ratings
A. Drawing accurately defined generalizations from one's own data, of the quality specified under B, or from a synthesis of other factual studies, of similar quality, to which specific references are given.....	40
B. Presenting, without generalizations, specific, systematic, comprehensive data, or an original compilation of data, of a statistical, case, archaeological, ethnological, historical, social survey, or other objective type.....	30

⁵ Taken by permission from a manuscript entitled: *A Manual for Experimental and Observational Sociology*.

C. Presentation of hypotheses, methods or suggestions arising in the process of research (of the type defined in A and B) but not yet adequately demonstrated-----	20
D. Conclusions drawn from general observation and experience or from principles generally accepted in the field in question, presented with specific illustration drawn from the real world (not from imagination) but without adequate, impartially sampled data-----	15
E. Criticisms, reviews and metaphysical syntheses of specific instances of other sociological work, not involving new scientific generalizations by the critic-----	15
F. Generalization, without data or specific illustrations drawn from the real world-----	5

In studying the article or chapter, watch carefully for the following auxiliary evidences of scientific method, and allow additional points as indicated:

SCIENTIFIC FEATURES	Maximum Credit
g. Expertness in field discussed, through protracted direct working contacts with its actual data other than the contacts involved in the particular piece of research (e.g., a life-long newspaper editor writing about newspapers)-----	10
h. Fair and adequate statements of cases not fitting the author's hypotheses, or of views conflicting with his own----	10
i. Fullness and clarity of significant detail in case histories or instances; scientific competency in use of the case method	10
j. Employment of genuinely experimental technique with or without control groups-----	7
k. Use of control group or groups, or of a fairly complete range of data, with scientific comparisons of groups at different points in the range-----	10
l. Clarity of logical organization, use of sub-heads, etc.----	8
m. Adequate footnotes for all references to data not included in the article or chapter-----	3
n. Statement of the probable errors of averages, percentages, etc., or reliability coefficients of measuring devices employed -----	2

Deductions should be made for the following features when they occur:

o. Use of language indicative of animus, prejudice, wishful thinking, or antagonism toward opponents-----	—15
p. Obvious sensationalism for popular consumption----	—10
q. Obviously biased selection of data-----	—15
r. Assertion of conclusions not justified by the data cited	—10
s. Fallacies in reasoning-----	—10

- t. Basing conclusions on citation of "authorities" who do not base their conclusions on scientific analysis of data--- -10
 u. Substitution of hypothetical cases for real ones----- - 8

The total of the original rating plus the auxiliary credits, and minus the deductions constitute the final score.

Articles by Ross, Giddings and Burgess, who stand high on the list, may be rated for illustration.

"The Population Boosters"⁶ by E. A. Ross, would fall, according to this scheme, into class D, and with the other features taken into consideration would score as follows:

D	15
g	3
l	6
p	(-10)
<hr/>	
Total	14

Similarly with (1) "Sociology as a Science"⁷ by F. H. Giddings, and (2) "Is Prediction Feasible in Social Work?"⁸ by E. W. Burgess:

(1)		(2)	
D	15	A	40
g	8	h	10
m	3	k	10
<hr/>		l	8
Total	26	m	3
		r	(-10)
		<hr/>	
		Total	61

Ratings of single articles by a single rater do not provide very reliable indexes of the scientific quality of the general work of the man rated. The writer scored the best article she could find for each of a number of sociologists prominent in the above list, and then averaged the scores with ratings obtained by from one to five students, each of whom rated several articles or chapters from outstanding books for each author rated. The results are as follows:

⁶ *Journal of Applied Sociology*, vol. 11, pp. 403, May, 1927.

⁷ *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 25, pp. 343-6, Oct., 1927.

⁸ *Social Forces*, vol 7, pp. 543-45, June, 1929.

TABLE III

<i>Sociologist</i>	<i>Index of Scientific Independent Ratings</i>	<i>Factuality Average</i>	<i>Number of References</i>	<i>Number of Authors Citing</i>
Chapin	55, 72	63	29	6
Allport	37, 74, 72	61	21	7
Ogburn	68, 40, 68	59	67	7
Bogardus	54, 76, 48	59	40	7
Burgess	61, 56, 56	58	92	8
Thomas	35, 68, 56, 64	56	57	10
Groves	29, 48, 44	40	0	0
Giddings	26, 36, 42, 32, 48	37	78	11
Ross	14, 28, 72, 16, 12, 4	24	86	9
McDougall	28, 12	20	17	7

While the ratings in this table vary considerably, there is enough consistency to indicate considerable reliability in the average indexes. For the first five men the lowest rating is 37. For the lowest three men on the list only three of 13 ratings are as high as 37.

The lack of correlation between the degree of factuality of the work of these men and the frequency with which they are cited in textbooks raises some interesting questions. If a longer list were rated, would it still appear that the attention given to the writings of a sociologist has no relation to the degree to which he founds his conclusions on specific and and systematized facts? Can a sociologist be significant without being factual, and factual without being significant? Are we in a transition stage in which the younger men will acquire their reputation on the basis of scientific research rather than on the basis of brilliant analysis of common knowledge and traditional opinion?

The above data are highly tentative and preliminary. It is to be hoped that critical students will take up and extend inquiries along these lines. The improvement of such methods as those outlined herein should stimulate younger men and women in sociology to examine their own research methods more critically, to measure their own work in comparison with others, to improve their own techniques, and to be more critical of the methods employed by other sociologists whose conclusions they employ.

CULTURE AS ENVIRONMENT

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THERE ARE certain ideas set forth by the Boas School of American Anthropologists which appear specifically or inferentially, in whole or in part, in practically all their theoretical writings. One of these deals with the relation of culture to physical environment, stating that the physical environment is important chiefly as a limiting rather than as a determinative factor in culture. Boas may be said to have first stated this theory in his *Mind of Primitive Man*¹ (1911). Lowie in 1917 repeated it.² In 1923, Kroeber³ and Wissler⁴ set forth the same theory. Wallis⁵ uses almost the identical phraseology. Dixon⁶ uses a different terminology, but the belief that the physical environment operates on man in an altogether different plane and manner from that of culture pervades the whole theoretical structure of American anthropologists. However greatly they disagree in other respects, in this they are almost unanimous. It has among them almost the force of a Durkheimesque collective representation, for there is a log-

¹ "... and it would seem that environment is important only in so far as it limits or favors the activities that belong to any particular group." P. 162

² "Geographical phenomena . . . represent . . . a limiting condition. . ." *Culture and Ethnology*, p. 62.

³ "... natural environment does impose certain limiting conditions; but . . . it does not cause inventions or institutions," *Anthropology*, p. 182.

⁴ "Environment furnishes the materials and in that sense only limits invention," *Man and Culture*, p. 319.

⁵ "We find that though the environment limits man . . ." *An Introduction to Anthropology*, p. 104.

⁶ "In the main environment is permissive, not mandatory. . ." *The Building of Cultures*, p. 13.

ical fallacy involved in the reasoning that one would expect them to have punctured by now if it were not a collective representation.

What is the line of reasoning pursued by these anthropologists? They find that in similar or identical physical environments, different types of cultural phenomena exist either at the same time or successively. This fact can be illustrated by the case of the Eskimo and the Chukchee in the arctic environment;⁷ and by the use made of Manhattan by the Algonquins, the Iroquois, and the white settlers.⁸ Since, therefore, the physical environment has been held constant in all these cases, while the cultures have varied, logically the varying factor must be the decisive one. This is, of course, unimpeachable reasoning. But note that this is a double-edged tool. Let us take the converse of this. Let us, in other words, hold the culture constant and vary the physical environment. Exactly the opposite conclusions can be drawn. In this case it is the culture which presents certain possibilities, which limits the patterns to be used, but it is the physical environment which is decisive. As an illustration let us take the very case cited by Goldenweiser, the use made of Manhattan. There exists in the present-day culture of the people of the United States, patterns for agriculture, for mining, for hunting, for forest preserves, for commerce, trade, shipping, etc. The use we will put Manhattan to is limited by the possibilities presented by our culture. We certainly won't use it for raising boa constrictors (any more than the Hottentot will invent an icebox) because that possibility is not part of our culture. We might, however, employ it for farming, forest preserves, or some similar use since these

⁷ Boas, *op. cit.*, p. 162; Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-5; A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, pp. 294-5.

⁸ Goldenweiser, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

are definitely part of our culture. What use do we actually put it to? We use it as a great commercial, shipping, trading, etc., center. What was the determinative factor in the selection of this pattern? Very obviously it was the physical environment of New York, its harbor, its easy accessibility from both the hinterland and Europe, etc. Of course the patterns had to be in our culture before we could apply it to Manhattan. This is as obvious as that snow must be present before men can use it for building houses. But these same patterns might have been used in Iowa, so far as the availability of the culture patterns is concerned. The culture patterns that are typical of New York may be said to have been determined by its location, i.e., its physical environment. If it is objected that our American culture determined what use it would be put to, then why did that culture not choose some other place for its great commercial center? Holding the factor of culture constant over a varied physical environment, we must concede that the physical environment determined what use Manhattan would be put to. Let us try a somewhat different illustration. Our culture presents a wide variety of fabrics that can be used for winter overcoats in Minnesota. It limits what we can use, for very obviously we cannot use a fabric which does not exist in our culture. But within the range of our culture we might wear overcoats of silk, chiffon, fur, wool, cotton, satin, etc. What is it that determines what we actually use? Within limits, of course, it is fashion. But ultimately it is the nature of Minnesota winters. Again, there is no cultural reason why Ohio should not be a great mining center. The pattern for mining was as much a part of the cultural heritage of northern Ohio as of Pennsylvania. What determined, then, that Pennsylvania should select and specialize in mining patterns and northern Ohio not?

The whole point is that the result you arrive at in your reasoning depends very largely on the use you make of logic. If you hold the physical environment constant and vary the culture, then of course the varying factor is the decisive one. If, on the other hand, you hold the cultural factor constant and vary the physical environment, then the physical environment is the decisive one. Anthropologists would be more accurate if they recognized this fact and formulated their theories in accordance with it. It is not the purpose of this article to champion any particular theory or interpretation. The older anthropogeographers emphasized the differentiating influence of natural environment; the modern anthropologists emphasize the limiting nature of natural environment rather than its determinative nature. Yet both present facts and problems. It is as important to know why the South developed its culture around cotton raising rather than around manufacturing, as it is to know why it was cotton rather than some other plant. The part of science is not to ignore facts or to minimize them if they contradict our predilections. It must simply find generalizations to fit all the facts, and if contradictory facts appear they too must be accounted for. Thus, for instance, the "laws" of the relation of culture and environment might be stated as follows: "If in similar or identical physical environments, different cultural patterns can be shown to have existed either contemporaneously or successively, then the decisive factor producing these cultural differences may be said to be cultural and not physical-environmental. If identical culture patterns are available over a varied physical environment, the patterns chosen by any particular locality will be determined by its physical environment."

Another theory, not quite so general, among modern American anthropologists, is that culture is a unique thing,

sui generis, entirely distinct from the physical environment on one side and human beings on the other.⁹ This dogma may be taken as the product of the archeological ancestry of anthropology. It is, of course, valuable to isolate certain factors out of a complex whole and thus to study and analyze them in more detail, and the anthropological students of culture may find it convenient to look at culture as distinct and unique, *sui generis*. This may be called the archeological method. According to this method all culture traits (including non-material ones) may legitimately be viewed as artifacts and treated the same way as a geologist or ecologist or botanist would treat his earth phenomena. But this method has dangers as well as advantages. The artificial distinction between culture and environment is one outstanding danger.

The social psychologist, and the social anthropologist when he ceases to be an archeologist and becomes a social psychologist,¹⁰ when he analyzes culture finds that it is not a thing apart from man. He finds, indeed, that it is a human creation. He finds, furthermore, that it is as much environment, and in the same way, as the natural environment.¹¹ This latter fact is particularly important. But what have you gained, the archeological, culture-in-a-vacuum anthropologist might ask, by calling culture environment? A number of things are gained. For one thing it is impossible to overlook the relation between man and culture when the latter is seen as product and environment of the first. In the second place, it clears up a number of one-sided and casuistical arguments put forth by anthropologists with respect to the relations of culture and natu-

⁹ Lowie, *Op. cit.*, Chapters I and III; Kroeber, "Eighteen Professions," *American Anthropologist*, N.S., XVIII:283-88 (1915).

¹⁰ For example, Wissler, *Op. cit.*, Part III.

¹¹ L. L. Bernard, "A Classification of Environments," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, XXXI:318-32 (1925).

ral environment, for there is scarcely a single generalization which can be made about the influence of the natural environment that can not, with some modification as to degree, be made about the cultural environment of man. Goldenweiser says that "civilization is dynamic, a thing of growth and development; while environment is comparatively inert and static."¹² But is this contrast legitimate? If we look at civilization apart from man, we find it as inert and static as nature itself. Houses, books, baskets, pottery, ideas, myths, religions, skyscrapers, automobiles are no more dynamic than mountains, oceans, winds, deserts, and monkeys. Indeed, culture is more inert, for we know that fauna and flora apart from man can travel great distances, that they cooperate, struggle, change, evolve, etc., whereas swastikas, pyramids, and epics, do not. The dynamic factor is not culture *per se*. It is man in a cultural environment.

We have already pointed out that the theory which states of the natural environment that it is merely a limiting factor in culture can apply also to culture viewed as environment. Indeed, the limiting nature of culture is one of its profoundest characteristics. If it makes certain inventions and innovations possible, it also makes others equally impossible—a fact well appreciated by utopists and reformers of all stripes.

Another theory, stated by Lowie, is as follows: ". . . environment is not only unable to create cultural features, in some instances it is even incapable of perpetuating them."¹³ He proceeds to illustrate this by reference to the loss of pottery in the New Hebrides, New Guinea, and the southwest of the United States. As an even more instructive case he points to the loss of the art of canoe-using by

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 300.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

the Melanesians of Torres Islands and concludes that "It is difficult to conceive of any people less like *a priori* to lose the art of navigation than a South Sea Island group; yet, their maritime environment proved inadequate to preserve so vital a feature of their daily life."¹⁴ As a substitute—and presumably antithetical—explanation of culture, Lowie offers culture. That is, he would explain culture in terms of itself. Now in the case of these Melanesians, his criticism of the natural environmental explanation would hold equally for culture. We might, indeed, restate his conclusion as follows: "It is difficult to conceive of any people less likely *a priori* to lose the art of navigation than a South Sea Island group; yet, their cultural environment proved inadequate to preserve so vital a feature of their daily life." In brief, man's cultural environment may be as much involved in the loss of traits as the natural environment.

Another alleged contrast between culture and natural environment is drawn with reference to invention. It is said that "the environment [and this always means natural environment with anthropologists] furnishes the builders of cultural structures with brick and mortar but it does not furnish the architect's plan."¹⁵ This is rather a bold statement to make in view of the disagreement among anthropologists themselves as to whether or not eoliths were human or natural products. It is entirely conceivable that natural bridges may have furnished the "architect's plan" for a cultural bridge. The floating log is another illustration, as is also the natural cave.

The cultural environment of a group (apart from man) is like the natural environment also in being permissive and not mandatory. If culture were indeed mandatory,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

as catching the measles, to use Wissler's picturesque phrase¹⁶ (and incidentally this is using the natural environment as a standard), then when compatible cultures were in contact we should expect willy nilly a mandatory, compulsive mutual determination. Yet we know this is not always the case. Lowie cites the cultural differences of the Hopi and Navajo Indians in Arizona and of the Bushmen and Hottentots of South Africa to illustrate how similarity of natural environment does not produce similarity in culture.¹⁷ These cases may with equal validity be cited to show that though the cultural environment of these groups permitted extensive borrowing, it did not compel it.

And so one might continue with all the generalizations offered with reference to the natural environment showing that they might also be applied to the cultural environment. With reference to influencing man their relationship is not different in kind but in degree. The important fact seems to be that man in adjusting to his natural environment creates a cultural environment to suit his needs, or seemingly to suit his needs. Once created, this cultural environment acts upon him psychologically exactly as the natural environment does in the sense that it is a source of stimuli. It is, however, a much more voluminous, much more direct, immediate, coercive, and suggestive source of stimuli than the natural environment. A man's house offers him more stimuli and adjustment possibilities than a mountain, a friend more than a wild animal, but these are no less facts in his environment. Either the natural or the cultural environment may offer materials and "architect's plans" for invention. With the growth, proliferation, and development of culture, however, it can offer much

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 50-2.

more. Also, people can carry their cultural environment with them. They can borrow elements from foreign cultures. That is, the elements of the cultural environment of man are motile, flexible, exchangeable. But the essential problem turns out to be not with reference to the relative influence of natural environment on culture, but with reference to the relative influence of both on man, and so put, there can be little difference of opinion. Man's cultural environment is everywhere and overwhelmingly and increasingly more direct, all-pervading, intimate, immediate, and compelling. But except in degree, it functions psychologically just as the natural environment does. In fact, the cultural environment of the naïve man-on-the-street is to him of equal "naturalness" with his natural environment.

The recognition of culture as human environment is important likewise with reference to the problem of the relation of psychology and anthropology. The objection of the social anthropologist to a psychology of innate human behavior¹⁸ is well taken. It is absurd to look for any light on culture in hereditary behavior patterns whether in the form of the old fashioned instincts or in Wissler's pseudo-behavioristic culture-building drive.¹⁹ Fortunately, however, the newer trends in psychology, especially social psychology emphasize the stimuli side of the behavior formula.²⁰ Social psychologists are trying to learn just how culture molds and forms human personality, why certain stimuli have more prestige and suggestive power than others, under what conditions certain responses may be expected, etc. But the objection urged by Lowie²¹ against

¹⁸ Lowie, *Op. cit.*, p. 16; Wissler, *Op. cit.*, p. 253.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 265-72.

²⁰ L. L. Bernard, "Trends in Social Psychology," *Social Forces*, II:737-43; also *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. III.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

psychology on the ground that it is too general argues a misapprehension of the nature of science. He says, e.g., that because a psychological law will explain equally well "the invention of the steam-engine and the phonograph, the sewing-machine and the harvester no less than the origin of paper-making," it is therefore useless in any specific case. This is as though an engineer should say of the law of falling bodies, "I cannot use it. It is too general. It refers equally well to the way a feather, a piece of paper, a brick, or a drop of water will fall. It does not tell me how my particular projectile will behave in this particular atmosphere." No scientific law ever perfectly describes the behavior of objects in natural conditions.²² The application of a general scientific law must always be made specifically to the problem involved. The person who applies the law must furnish the data. Thus the engineer must himself apply the law of falling bodies to a certain body falling at a particular place. Similarly the social anthropologist must supply the concrete facts when applying psychology to his problems. Where such data are lacking, as in Lowie's case of the Chinese inventor of paper, psychology is scarcely of value, just as the law of falling bodies is useless to the engineer who does not know the conditions where he is to apply it. But suppose we had a detailed life-history of every inventor in culture history. We might then construct an inductive psychology of invention, general, to be sure, but of incalculable value in the interpretation of culture. The trouble with psychology (I refer of course to scientific psychology) is not that it is general, but that it is incomplete.

²² Bernard, "Scientific Method and Social Progress," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, XXXI:1-18.

TEACHING OF INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY

An Introductory Note

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A PRIMARILY important problem for every efficient instructor in sociology lies in his ability to clarify for himself the particular nature and scope of sociology. This is a first requisite for it will be otherwise impossible for him to plan his own unique method of approach to the subject matter that will be largely determined by his grasp of the concept. Shall sociology be for him and his students a study of human behavior in its varied social situations, "the exploration and explanation of human life as a whole,"¹ as the late Doctor Howard once so aptly expressed it? Or shall he treat sociology as a methodology or technique for the study of human relationships to be utilized by social scientists in the related fields? Shall he think of it as a study of the "forms of socialization,"² the study of social processes which result in the formation of groups and group values offering stimuli for the conditioning of behavior? It may be possible to reconcile and synthesize these, but it is the writer's conviction that for introductory courses in sociology, this procedure would tend to confusion. It is always disturbing to a beginning student to be constantly "dragged" from one point of view to another. Indeed, a parallel to this may be drawn by referring to the artist and his conception of the scene that he is painting. It is necessary for him to select a point of view and to re-

¹ Cf. "Sociology: Its Critics and Its Fruits," *Jour. of Applied Sociology*, VI, 1.

² Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, p. 44.

tain that until the completion of the picture. There may have to be completed several pictures with the several points of view in evidence before the whole situation is completely visualized and understood, and it is so with the sociologist and his final and complete realization of the all of sociology.

Whatever point of view may be selected will determine in part the analysis of the objectives of the course. Without a carefully compiled list of objectives, the instructor will very likely find that his course will be without that which is so necessary for a complete and unified presentation of the subject matter. And these objectives must be revealed clearly throughout the presentation of the content of the course. I am here referring to those specific objectives for sociology and not to those general objectives which must necessarily be present in every course of value for the college student, such as those objectives which declare that the student must be presented with material which shall stimulate and challenge him to enter the arena of free and independent thinking.

Let us suppose that the instructor in charge decides that for the introductory course, sociology shall be presented to the student as a study of human behavior in its varied social situations, as "an exploration and explanation of social life as a whole." What specific objectives shall be stressed with this conception in mind? One of the first aims of the instructor should be to reveal to his students that the new subject deals with the study of human activities as they report themselves in responses to the varied stimuli present in the social situations; furthermore that they as human beings already have a great deal of material already in their grasp which needs only to be recalled, reflected upon, and analyzed to attain a newer and more scientific sociological meaning. Real life situations are in a

very definite sense the laboratory material for the novice. Now he must be taught to observe more carefully, to interrogate the meaning of every action, to record his own reactions to the new stimuli of the situation in which he finds himself. In other words, he must learn to evaluate the values in the social situation. The roles of the participant observer and the spectator should be clearly analyzed and differentiated for him.

It is altogether important that the novice shall be introduced to a functional and experimental sociology—a sociology which shall be concerned with the realistic and the actual occurrences of social situations and that he be led to draw scientifically his conclusions from the mass of observed and analyzed data which he has gathered. Thus, the facts of life are faced squarely, and his generalizations will be based upon his own concrete laboratory observations and investigations. Systematic knowledge based upon the objective method aided as far as possible by a statistical approval should impress the student with the idea that he is playing the role of a coworker in the unfolding and the development of a science. For nothing seems so provocative and urging to the beginner as to become aware of the potentialities of his own creative thinking and the rewards which accrue to the discoverer and the inventor. This is making sociology truly functional.

With his own contributions as foundations, the early realization of another objective must be fostered and cultivated. I refer to the use of the symbols of the craft. It is well to provide for the introduction of these early in the course, since their usage is important from the standpoint of the sociological interpretation of data. In this way, the apprentice comes to observe that a sociological solution should be presented with the use of the "tools of sociol-

ogy,"³ just as an algebraic solution is found with the aid and use of the symbols of algebra, so to speak. The usage of the tools also affords the student with a knowledge of the accomplishments that have been realized, of the trails that have been blazed for him. In this short article, it is unnecessary to go further into the analysis of the possible specific objectives, for a scholarly and energetic instructor can evolve those which are of first-rate importance in the development of the subject-matter.

These objectives and their fulfillment will be of invaluable aid in the selection of a text, if one be desired, or in the preparation of the outline of the course. A good text will serve to guide the reading, but its use should not be such that it will serve as a crutch without which no steps may be taken. This would defeat the purpose of a functional sociology. Rather the text should be used for comparative and substantiating purposes—a measurement and a test for the inductive generalizations arrived at independently by the cooperating group of students. Frequently then, with such usage, may come those comments and criticisms which may be full of good omen for the advancement of the science. The good text will be stimulative in the direction of suggestions which compel students to launch forth upon independent investigations. The instructor will appear in the role of the inspirational leader who directs but who is prepared to acquire new information from his agents in the field. Every interested student will bring his own particular experiences to the class discussions; he may be encouraged to penetrate or bore into his own life-history for the purpose of personality research. Creative ability will have been encouraged and directed into productive channels.

³ Cf. Emory S. Bogardus, "Tools in Sociology," *Sociology and Social Research*, XIV, 332.

The student should be directed to enter into various social situations in order to record his impressions of the attitudes brought into play in these. The industrial establishment, the welfare agency, the city council chamber, the recreational center, the church meeting, and the social club meeting are all capable of affording splendid raw materials for enhancing his knowledge of the behavior of persons in groups. The technique of the interview may be gradually developed so that he may understand more fully the attitudes disclosed and unfolded. These experiences may then be compared with what trained sociologists in the field have reported concerning the activities and experiences of comparable situations.⁴

Students may be advised to keep a scrap book or a source book of materials in which may be placed newspaper and magazine articles reporting the objective social situations in which attitudes and values are clearly indicated. A not unprofitable exercise may arise in analyzing the reported situation, attempting to ascertain the "why" of the behavior of the persons in the specific situation. Through an enlivening realization of this kind of a functional and experimental sociology, the writer has found that students regard their introductory course as a kind of stimulant which demands further study and which encourages them to increase their understanding of personal and group behavior in advanced courses.

⁴ Cf. Clifford R. Shaw, "Case Study Method," *Pub. Amer. Sociological Society*, XXI, 149 ff.; see also W. I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *The Child in America*, Ch. IV.

OPINIONS CONCERNING UNSKILLED MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS*

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During the past eight years about a thousand Mexican laborers mostly unskilled, have migrated to Flint, Michigan. They have settled in the northeast section of the city, scattered among the Negroes, Hungarians, and Roumanians. Most of the adult males among these Mexicans work, when they can get work, in the Buick factory. They purchase supplies from the neighborhood stores, are observed and arrested by the police of a nearby substation, send their children to the Fairview School, are treated by the social workers and a few doctors who work in that area, find themselves the object of investigation by the continuation schools, and have contacts with their neighbors. The Mexican is a relatively new element in the community.

Forty neighbors of these unskilled Mexicans living in the northeast section of Flint were interviewed.¹ The nationalities of these forty neighbors of the Mexicans are:

Polish.....	2
Serbian.....	5
Croatian.....	2
Hungarian.....	22
American.....	7
Negro.....	2

* This article is a part of a study of group opinion and the Mexican immigrant, made in Flint, Michigan. The opinion study included a statistical treatment of the opinions of 600 Junior College and High School students in Flint, and the collection of interviews with members of groups having primary contacts with the Mexicans. The opinions of business men, school children, teachers, police, social workers and professional men are summarized in a fashion similar to this article. The tests given to the 600 students are worked out on an opinion scale.

¹ Fifteen of these interviews were conducted by Mrs. McKenzie, Head of the Visiting Nurses, and Miss Pluth of the International Institute. The other twenty-five were secured by the author. This division accounts for a part of the returns marked as "not stated" in the general statements recorded above, as these two interviewers and myself did not use exactly the same general outline.

OPINIONS CONCERNING MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS 63

During the course of the interviews a few general questions were worked into the discussion. The responses to these questions are listed below. The remainder of the interview consisted of random discussion by the person interviewed in an attempt to elicit those statements about the Mexican which the neighbors were most willing to talk about, and which first occurred to them.

The general assertions were:

1. The Mexicans of the neighborhood are:	
clean and neat.....	3
slovenly and dirty.....	31
not stated.....	6
2. The Mexican children are:	
neighborhood nuisances.....	5
well behaved.....	25
not stated.....	10
3. The Mexicans are very:	
shiftless and careless.....	34
not stated.....	6
4. They move too often, are not a solid element:	
true	34
not stated.....	6
5. The effects of the Mexican immigration on work are:	
bad, keeps wages down.....	17
does not affect.....	5
don't know.....	18
6. Prices of houses in the neighborhood are:	
lowered	15
not affected.....	8
don't know.....	17
7. The Mexican is accustomed to:	
go to church.....	16
not to go to church.....	4
not stated.....	20
8. The Mexican people:	
drink and are quarrelsome..	13
are quiet.....	19
not stated.....	8

Of the forty persons interviewed ten were young adults, that is, from 17 to 25 years of age, nine were older men and twenty-one were older women.

Some excerpts from the experiences and opinions of a few of the young adults will be presented first.

Miss E., Hungarian girl, age 20.

We came here from Detroit about eighteen months ago. The first time I went out in this district to find some friends, I couldn't find where they lived. I think about 20 Mexicans must have made remarks to me when I stopped at different houses to ask for the people I was hunting. It seemed like every house I stopped at had Mexicans in it. A lot of them were out in front of the houses. I was mad and scared, too, but mostly scared. I didn't like the way the Mexican men looked at me, then, and I don't like it now. It makes me feel funny, they stare at me so much.

I keep away from the whole district now as much as possible. I don't like it, and I wish we'd move. I dislike the Mexicans very much, they're bad.

Miss F., Serbian, age 20, student.

A Mexican family moved on to our street. The neighbors don't like them as they say the Mexicans and negroes depreciate the value of property. The Mexicans and negroes are very much together, I know a number of cases where Mexicans and negroes live together. That's terrible. I know of only two cases where Mexicans married whites (Hungarians) and I can't understand why the parents permitted it.

My first impressions of a Mexican are of a man who was acquainted with my father some years ago. He was large and rather handsome, and he played with me when he came to see us. I liked him, I can't say that I've liked any since that, though.

I resent the Mexicans being brought in here, allowed to migrate almost freely while others are restricted. My cousins can't get in and yet they bring these lower elements in. Besides, the Europeans are arrested every once in a while for being smuggled in through Canada, and the Mexicans aren't arrested. The Mexicans are favored in the giving out of jobs, rough labor, at the Buick factory. The Mexicans stick together too, they never tell on one another.

OPINIONS CONCERNING MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS 65

I don't like them, I'm opposed to them, don't think they should be permitted to come in, and those here who are not citizens should be put out.

Here is an example of a rationalized opposition. This girl was the best educated and apparently the most intelligent of any of the persons interviewed. Her primary contact experiences with Mexicans had not been disagreeable, at least insofar as she expressed them. Her resentment and prejudice seemed real, she became very angry. She had proceeded from a favorable attitude, toward an individual as a child, to a definite prejudice, toward the whole group as an adult, on the basis of a rationalized opposition.

Mr. B., student, age 19.

These Mexicans are crowded all over the place. Next door to us they're so crowded they come out in the yard to eat. In the summer they eat out in the back yard, just walk around and eat, and then throw melon rinds and stuff all over the place. They're dirty as hogs. Sometimes they kinda dress up a little, the younger ones, but I don't think they're very clean. You know there's so many of them in that house next to us that I don't know how many there are. They seem to move around a good bit and new ones come in and out.

I don't know how they get along. I used to work in an A and P store. They always bought good food, what they did buy, when they had money. The women are pretty dumb, they never do learn to talk. I delivered a box of peas one day which weren't what the woman wanted, and she was too dumb to tell me.

The worst thing about these Mexicans is that they're stubborn and bull-headed. They fight, too. I work in a theatre now, usher. I've had trouble with four or five Mexicans. They annoy women and I got to report them to the manager. There's lots of them go to this theatre and they're the most stubborn and bull-headed people we got to handle. They're more particular than white people about sitting beside a nigger. They think the usher is just trying to put them there and they won't go.

Miss D. B., age 17.

A couple of years ago I used to go around a lot with a Mexican girl my age. She's married now, has been married since she was 14.

She told me about the Mexicans. She never wanted to get married, either, but her parents made her marry a Mexican. He was about 20 years older, and a bad actor. She's going to leave him and study music when she gets some money. I think they're all awful. I've heard that when the Mexican men get mad at their wives they just leave them and exchange wives for a month or so. The people of the neighborhood think they're all bad about things like that, anyway. Some of my friends have been insulted by them, but I never have. I'm glad we're going to move, though, I'm not comfortable any more.

I don't think they go to church at all, my friend told me they didn't. They swear a lot in Spanish and my friend said if she translated what they said I'd be shocked. I never did find out what some of the words meant.

They're all terribly dirty and crowded. I heard once of 25 in one house, and I know of one place where there's twelve in one downstairs. Some of the women try to keep up the houses but it's no use, the men just lie around and don't seem to care about the house. I think they're all a bad people.

In the first interview, that with Miss E., may be noted an instance of the development of a prejudicial attitude from a personal aggression; in the second case, Miss F., a rationalized procedure from secondary contacts and information has made for prejudice; in the instance of Mr. B., the idea of the Mexican woman as "dumb" has developed from a few experiences as a delivery boy, of the Mexican families as dirty, from his neighborhood contacts, of the Mexican man as "stubborn," "bull-headed," and aggressive from his disagreements with them in the theatre. Miss D. B. finds the sex mores of the Mexican scandalous, but, I suspect, interesting. Her friend has apparently been her informant on a much wider range of information than has been divulged in this interview. At the same time, Miss D. B. finds the procedure of the parents in forcing her friend to marry, the cause for some criticism of the Mexican social organization in general.

These young adults have arrived at their attitudes from varied personal experiences, but they have generalized, and are critical of the Mexican immigrant. It may be noted that the young adults were, in general, much more critical of divergent customs than were the elders. Of the ten interviewed, eight expressed opinions indicative of decidedly prejudicial attitudes. Of the other two; one, the son of a storekeeper, was favorable to the presence of the Mexicans in the community, although he considered them inferior. He stated that they were necessary to provide a labor supply and prosperity. The other, a girl, who worked in a dentist's office maintained that the Mexicans were good pay, were a friendly people, and that some of the young men would be good looking if they'd get a haircut. With the exception of three or four adults who had had unfavorable experiences, the younger people were much more disdainful, opposed to, or afraid of the Mexican.

The Adult Males. Records of the interviews with the nine adult men, reveal that they spontaneously asserted in six cases that the Mexicans drink and fight too much, and are dangerous, three mentioned that they were destructive of property, five stated that they steal in a petty way, and seven asserted or intimated from the tone of the interview, that they considered the Mexican an economic incapable, who could not compare with themselves. Curiously enough, only one man mentioned that the Mexican was an economic competitor. It was among the women and younger adults that this statement appeared in 17 cases. A few illustrative excerpts are here included:

Mr. P., Hungarian. I work in Fisher now. I did work in the Buick and the Mexican fellows work there. They're an all right people, but just not so smart, that's all. The Mexicans, they're pretty good fellow, but they work at sweepers and clean up, and those things at the 38 and 40 cents an hour. Me, I make 90 cents. I not like the job at Buick I have, too much gas, it makes me sick

at the stomach, so I move to Fisher. The Mexican work there at Buick, but he's not very smart.

Mr. K., Hungarian. I know three of them Mexicans at Buick 20. They don't have good jobs, no, but they're new people. The Hungarian people have been here good while, but the Mexican he just come.

I room at a house last year that has two Mexican boarders. They're O.K. people, but I just say "good morning," "good night," to them. I don't know them much. They work steady and are O.K. people. Where there's lots of them, they fight.

My brother, he has a house he rent to seven or ten Mexicans, and they're fight all the time. They fight when there's so many of them.

Mr. N., Hungarian. The Mexican, they're just a dumb-bell people, I guess.

I used to work at Buick, work at Fisher now. No Mexicans at Fisher. At Buick they do the sweep up.

Last summer I saw a fight of two Mexicans. They fight and one, he gets cut in the rump. I help carry him over to the restaurant, and we call an ambulance. He bleeds a lot.

These Mexicans, they drink too much, fight too much. Bad fighters when they get in big bunches.

Mr. M., Hungarian janitor. Last night three fellows out here, they chase another fellow and catch him. Yeh, he's a Mexican. They give him to the police, for they say the Mexican try to steal a Ford coupe. The glass was busted and a basket of groceries was gone out of it. Guess that's what he wanted.

That's the worst thing about them, they steal, but I don't blame them. They oughtn't to bring them up here.

Say, I had a flashlight stole out of my car last week, and I'll bet a Mexican stole it. I never thought of that, but they're bad stealers.

Mr. J., Hungarian. I had six of them Mexicans working for me over at Chevrolet, several years ago. When they start to talk they mean it. A couple of them pretty good fellows, though. I'm scared of the rest. Mister, one day I told them fellows to move a piece of iron, he pick up a bar and say he hit me over the head. I never like them. You can't tell them to do nothing. When they start to talk, they get a gang around right away, they're just like niggers, they mean it when they talk. I'm scared of them. These ones next door ain't so bad, though, but you can't tell.

Although these questions were asked about the Mexicans living next door to these men, they soon carried the discussion to generalizations or to work contacts. They appeared, in general, to be unwilling to discuss the Mexican next door. The women interviewed showed no such reticence about the neighbors. It may be that the men did not discuss those next door, because: (1) they were less informed than the women as to the behavior of their neighbors; (2) unwillingness, or fear, to make disparaging statements; (3) the men, to a greater extent than the women, were somewhat suspicious of the purpose of the interview.

The Adult Females. Of the 21 adult females, only 7 expressed fear of the Mexicans as neighbors, but 19 said they were very dirty and slovenly, while 12 thought that wages were kept down by the presence of the Mexican. There was high agreement that the children were not bothersome, 17 stating this to be the case. In general, the women dislike the presence of the Mexicans in the neighborhood, although exceptions were made of four or five Mexican families. The women, much more than the men, thought of the Mexican as an economic competitor and stated that conditions would be better if the Mexicans weren't in Flint. The men were rather derogatory of the economic capability of the Mexican, and thought of the Mexican as doing jobs which others didn't want, anyway.

A few instances of the development of unfavorable attitudes from primary contact experiences may be presented:

Mrs. M., Hungarian. The worst thing is that they're too loudy. They're not so bad now, but Oh, Lordy, it's awful in the summer. Last summer my son couldn't sleep because them Mexicans made so much noise. And they don't have any shame. Why I tell them to stop, they just used bad words. I don't know what the words mean, but they talk them fast. And that house, why there's ten or more men coming in and out just like a "sporting house." I don't know what to do about those men going in and out. Little children

ten or twelve years old learn bad things from seeing that. But I guess them Mexicans were just taught that way, and don't know any better. And I don't like children to see drunken men.

Last summer they played baseball in the street, and the baseball came on our porch and hit my little girl. My husband take the ball and say he keep it. The Mexicans came over a talking and a arguing. Pretty soon they all got mad and one said, "get your knife." I pulled Jim back and said, "They're so wild, don't you dare say anything, or they'll burn the house down. I sent my son for the police, and the Mexicans say, "We'll watch that fellow." I never let my son go out again for a week in the evening.

Once we were going to sell the house, and a family wanted it, but wouldn't buy it because of the Mexicans next door.

And their garbage can's never covered, and rats, dogs, cats, and oh, Lordy, everything else. They lost the cover, so I covered it with a paper several times.

Mrs. P., Hungarian. These Mexicans are none too clean, some have 10 or 15 families in one house. A house burned down on our street that had 12 beds in it.

They wear overalls on Sunday, I don't like that.

They work for almost nothing, they'd work for 10 cents an hour. I had a letter from my brother in Elgin and he says there's a lot of them there who would work for 10 cents or 25 cents an hour.

They like to drink, last Tuesday two of the Mexican men next door were drunk, and flopping around in the snow. They flopped and flopped. I locked the door.

I don't like to be out nights. I went over to a friend's house who was dead last week and coming back a dark man chased me. I'll bet he was a Mexican.

Mrs. R., We moved because of the Mexicans and negroes. There was Mexicans next door. After we sold and moved the house was rented to Mexicans, who tore it apart. My father rented a house to Mexicans, and they tore the thing apart, they cut up the old garage for kindling wood.

The Mexicans next door were noisy, made a lot of music and stayed up late, they had a guitar or something that made a bad noise. They yelled too. And they ran away with the rent only paid one month, and then they stayed several months and ran away—they're not honest.

There were about ten people in that house, but the children stayed in mostly and seemed to behave. I don't believe the children had enough clothes to come out.

Some people told me that they had coal and wood stolen by the Mexicans, but we never did.

The women whose statements are here presented expressed fear of the Mexicans of the neighborhood. This fear was based upon the drunken and disorderly conduct of their immediate neighbors, but had been generalized to include the entire group. Only seven of the twenty-one women stated that they were afraid of the Mexican in the neighborhood in any way. The others had had no disagreeable experiences and had not been made fearful by such stories purveyed by gossip. Perhaps they discounted the sources of the stories.

Conflict situations in which the behavior of the Mexican is judged not only on the basis of single actions, but cumulatively on the basis of past disagreeable experiences are illustrated by the above interviews. To Mrs. M., her Mexican neighbors became more and more obnoxious as a larger number of culture differences, as well as differences in temperament, became apparent. They were "too loudy," which was bad enough, but was increased by maternal solicitude when the son could not sleep. They used bad words, or at least she thought the words were bad, for they were spoken loudly. She suspected their sex behavior, they threatened her husband and her son, and they persistently neglected the garbage can, and then came the revelation that property value and saleability had been affected by the Mexican neighbors.

The combination which may be made between information and the interpretation of behavior may be individually unique. For instance, Mrs. P. states that the Mexicans swear a great deal. She states that her neighbors are swearing all the time, using words like hell, devil, Lord, God, etc. Her interpretation is, however, that the

Mexicans are a very religious people, and learn these words from the Bible so that their swearing is in proportion to their religious training.

Conflict situations have a high memory value in the neighborhood, while favorable comments are largely generalized. That the Mexican attends church regularly was commented on by 16 of the 20 people who mentioned church attendance at all. That the Mexican children seemed well behaved, were kept largely indoors, and were not troublesome, was stated by 25. It may be pointed out in this connection that those who made this statement were, in general, the young adults and the males. Some of the housewives who had children in school expressed the opinion that the Mexican children were bad. The way in which non-invasion of status may be the source of favorable comment is illustrated by Mrs. E., who said, "The Mexican women next door, she got water from my house for about a year. She never would come into my house to get it, but always stood outside. She say that my house is so clean and my kitchen is so clean and she is so dirty that she stay outside. I like the Mexicans all right." One woman, Mrs. M., a Hungarian woman who could speak Spanish, was being very attentive to a Mexican woman neighbor, who was about to have a child. Mrs. M. stated that she felt very sorry for this woman because she didn't know whether she was married or not.

A record of the casual gossip of the neighborhood secured by a participant observer would provide valuable material in the tracing of experiences which account, in part, for race prejudice. The study of opinion as indicative of attitude carried on either through tests or interviews or the records of participant observers, has as its objective a record which relates the opinion to the experiences which caused it. The goal is to seek and record experiences as whole units.

PERSONALITY AND THE GENES

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A NEW DAY has opened for the understanding of the role of heredity in personality. No less an authority than H. S. Jennings of Johns Hopkins University has brought the findings of biology to date and interpreted them clearly and reasonably.¹ His work on *The Biological Basis of Human Nature* is of outstanding importance to sociologists. It is worth owning and pondering.

Genes is the magic word. What electrons are to physics, relativity to philosophy, vitamins to dietetics, stimulus and response to psychology, genes are to biology. Professor Jennings has written a volume on genes and their meaning for human nature. Without claiming as much he has written a new eugenics.

The New Decalogue of Science that so many easy minds swore by and quoted glibly from the housetops is thrown into the discard. The New Decalogue is shown to be partly fallacious because it naively accepted a too simple biology; it seems to have perpetrated more fallacies and unsound judgments than it corrected. Its argument for aristocracy and against democracy looks like skim milk alongside of the biological data advanced by Jennings.

Genes are the diverse substances or particles found in the chromosomes of the germ cell.² The twenty-four pairs of chromosomes with which a human life starts are found to contain a thousand or so particles or determinants of

¹ H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*, W. W. Norton & Co., 1930, pp. xviii-384.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

traits.³ These particles or genes are in pairs and exist in the chromosomes like two strings of beads side by side. One string comes from the father; the other from the mother. Each gene has its regular place in the chromosomes and can be numbered as four or forty-seven.⁴ The advantages of having two parents are clear,⁵ for if a gene inherited from one parent is defective and the mate from the other parent is normal, the latter gene functions for both. Defective genes are usually recessive. If, however, a given gene from one parent is defective and the corresponding gene from the other parent is also defective then the child will likely be defective in that trait. Hence, the danger of related people marrying. The offspring is likely to inherit two defective genes of the same number in the gene chain. A normal person may carry many defective genes, but no harm will come until he becomes the parent of an individual who inherits from the other parent a similar defective gene.

A child may be superior to both parents, or inferior to them. Take the latter instance first. Both parents may be normal in a given trait, but each have one defective gene with reference to that trait. Then some of their children will inherit a defective gene in that trait from both parents and be defective.⁶ But how about superior children being born to defective parents? "Two parents may both be seriously defective, perhaps in the same characteristic, and yet produce offspring that are all without the personal defects."⁷ One parent may be deficient in both members of

³ Professor Jennings speaks of a thousand genes, but does not indicate how he arrives at this general figure.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15. One parent may be stupid and the other lazy, but the offspring may be both lively in intelligence and industrious.

a gene-pair, and hence be deficient in that trait, but the child will inherit a normal corresponding gene from the other parent. The latter parent may be deficient in both members of another gene-pair and be deficient in that trait, but the child will inherit a corresponding normal gene from the first parent. In this way a child may be normal in both characteristics although one parent was quite deficient in one regard and the second parent in the other trait.

But the inheritance of personality traits is not so simple as all this implies, as Professor Jennings makes clear; the inheritance of a given gene does not necessarily mean the inheritance of a given trait or personality characteristic. In addition there is a certain working together of a large number of genes. It is this *working together* of the genes that is as vital as the inheritance of particular genes.⁸ Two parents may be defective in the same characteristic, but because of defects in different gene-pairs; hence, the offspring may be normal.⁹

How does individual superiority arise? What is the biological basis of personality greatness? "By the production of new combinations in which the genes of the parents supplement each other, superior individuals are produced."¹⁰ Again there is the interaction principle at work, which accounts for the superiority of offspring to parent. By *different combinations* of the *same set of genes*, it is possible to produce "superior individuals, mediocre individuals, and inferior individuals."¹¹ The number of different combinations of genes is in the thousands, and the chances of superiority are many, as well as of inferiority.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 195. The inheritance of a unit character does not depend on any one gene, but on the interaction of many.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

The *environment* of the genes plays a significant role. A set of genes do not produce a trait according to any simple rule of inheritance.¹² If you inherit a certain gene you will be superior; if not, you will be inferior: all this is twaddle. What a gene becomes depends on the surroundings of the germ cell, on the cells in contact with the germ cell, on the hormones that bathe this cell.¹³ "An individual that would otherwise become an imbecile, a cretin, is caused to become a normal intelligent person if fed upon thyroid."¹⁴ Hormones, the products of the endocrine glands,¹⁵ are basic in gene development. They constitute a part of the environment of the genes. Individuals with the same genes, as in the case of identical twins, may differ according to what happens to these genes in their development.¹⁶ Thus the appearance of geniuses such as Shakespeares, Keatses, Lincolns, in mediocre families is entirely natural.¹⁷ Such happenings follow the laws of heredity and depend on the nature, the interaction, and on the environment of the genes; and on the stimuli and opportunities of the social environment. All personality characteristics are "products of development, and development is always through an interaction of the materials of inheritance; the genes, and other things (that is) the environment."¹⁸

The ease with which some people become advocates of eugenics is dangerous. Professor Jennings points out a number of fallacies in the claim of popular eugenics. Some of these mistakes are: (1) It is fallacious "to sum up he-

¹² *Ibid.*, Ch. V.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Hormones, or certain of them, may be manufactured outside the human body.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

redity in the maxim that like produces like."¹⁹ (2) It is fallacious to claim that hereditary characteristics are not alterable by the environment. (3) It is fallacious to assume that since all human characteristics are hereditary, heredity is all-important in human affairs. (4) Another fallacy is the belief "that superior individuals must have come from superior parents."²⁰ (5) Another fallacy is the dogma widely proclaimed that biology requires an aristocratic constitution of society.²¹ (6) It is fallacious to believe that more superior offspring arise from distinguished parents than from the mass of mediocre parents.²²

Special attention is given by Professor Jennings to the disharmonic theory of inheritance. According to it, a person may inherit for instance a large body but a small heart or kidneys, or vice versa;²³ long legs and short arms. More serious is the inheritance of contradictory mental traits so that an individual easily becomes a dual personality.

Our author indicates that experimental data in biology support the theory of emergent evolution²⁴ rather than the theory of mechanical evolution. In biology, new things and new methods of action emerge, not calculable nor predictable from what has gone before.²⁵ The possibilities of variation in personality are almost infinitely great. The particular combination of genes that go to make up any person is only one in 5,000,000,000,000,000 that might have resulted.²⁶ Each human combination is derived from one of his parents, "possessed of somewhat more than 17,000 germ

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 211, 247.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 248.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

²⁴ For an extensive treatment of emergent theory of personality see R. G. Gordan, *Personality*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926.

²⁵ Jennings, *ibid.*, p. 360.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

cells, while the other had the very considerable number of 300,000,000,000. Every germ cell has a different combination of genes."²⁷ But the possible combination of germ cells is only one phase of the inheritance of a given individual. It is not the germ cells, the chromosomes, the genes as such that count the most, but the total working together of these units in hormone environments that are significant in the heredity of personality. Out of a given combination of genes emerges the unique traits that make for uniqueness in every personality.

The practical value of present knowledge about genes is threefold. First, therapeutic or environmental measures may be taken so that the genes will have the best possible chance. The environment ranges from the harmonic fluids to constructive social stimuli. Second, "by proper matings, inferior genes may be so combined with superior ones that the defective genes have no effect, or little."²⁸ Third, the defective genes may be eradicated. In other words, "the individual bearing the defective genes must not produce offspring."²⁹ In these three ways the laws of heredity may be utilized and observed to the advantage of personality.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 234. At this point the author questions the validity of social welfare work which enables the weaklings and low grade (biologically) to survive and to continue strains of low-grade genes.

Book Notes

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By BERNARD C. EWER. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1929, pp. xxix+436.

Social psychology is a growing science and needs repeated systematic restatements of the subject-matter covering the whole field. The need for a periodic restatement of the principal features in the light of new findings and advancements is the chief justification for another textbook on this subject. There is a great variation in the subject matter of social psychological treatises. "Not only do they present conflict of theory; they exhibit an astonishing disagreement in the range of special topics chosen for discussion." Yet the writer feels that certain important trends have taken special form: namely, an analysis of the mind of the individual in order to determine the sources of social relationship, the diminishing emphasis upon instinct and an increasing emphasis upon the processes of learning, and gradual concurrence in the topical lines of treatment. The aim of the author is to synthesize and present in an elementary but comprehensive and systematic way material dealing with social consciousness and social behavior. "The distinctive features are its explicit statement of the nature of higher and lower levels of social process, and its emphasis upon thought as a supremely important social function."

The book is divided into four parts, dealing successively with fundamental principles, individuality, the social order, and then appendices on social behavior systems. The aim of social psychology is to "describe and explain behavior in terms of mental processes." In a wider sense it deals with the social aspects of the individual mind and the mental aspects of human association. The fundamental principles are stated in a clear and systematic fashion, dealing with mental basis of society, instinct, the learning process, imitation and suggestion, social thought and motives. The section on individuality deals with the problems of personality; race, sex, and family inheritance; leadership; and maladjustment. Personality is interpreted largely in its psychological aspects, as consisting of physical traits, intelligence, emotional traits, and self-expression, rather than the sum and organization of all the traits which determine a man's role within the group. In fact the author has distinctly a psychological bent,

which is exhibited particularly in the first half of the book but which is also apparent in the latter half. There is likewise a holdover of the older concepts of psychology and social psychology, though the newer developments are recognized. The latter part of the book deals more definitely with group life, including a discussion of the crowd, custom and fashion, morals, social control, conflict, and progress. Then, too, various systems of social behavior, such as speech and laughter; play, art, and music; religion and philanthropy; patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism, are treated from a sociopsychological point of view. The whole treatment is comprehensive and the author's attitude is catholic and sympathetic. M. H. N.

A NEW ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by KIRBY PAGE. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1930, pp. 387.

This new book, edited by Kirby Page, is a most valuable symposium, expressing the views, for and against, of capitalism, fascism, communism, and socialism, held by a group of eminently qualified students. Adding to this measure, the second part of the book is devoted to discussions on ways of transforming the present competitive system into a cooperative order.

The case for capitalism is ably presented by Professor Seligman who writes: "It (capitalism) is responsible for the greatest hitherto-known production and dissemination of wealth, and despite some disquieting manifestations, bears within itself the seeds of the progressive identification of individual and social welfare." Professor Mussey, finding capitalism wanting in its overwhelming success, holds that it has made men lose sight of those spiritual values so necessary to a long-lived society; rightly he indicates that life is more than meat, and the body more than raiment.

Angelo Guido defends fascism on pragmatic grounds; he thinks that the present prosperity of Italy is reason enough for supporting it. In contrast, Professor Elliott of Harvard discovers that fascism has reared but a fictitious stability in Italy. Furthermore, it has suppressed every vestige of independence and liberty, and has crushed the creative spirits of many leaders. For communism, Anna Rochester takes up the cudgels of defense and writes that in Russia, "wages have risen, and the great haunting fears of unemployment, illness, and old age have been dispelled by the most comprehensive social insurance system in the world." But, Jerome Davis feels that lack of liberty for all but one party—the Communist Party. Norman

the gravest objection to communism as at present conducted is its Thomas, socialist warrior, believes that socialism alone offers a saving faith, a hope, and a philosophy whereby civil liberties will be preserved and increased. John E. Edgerton is inclined to condemn socialism on the ground that because it has no theory of economics, its practices would be without foundation.

In Part II, among many writers, Professor Douglas discusses his minimum wage and family allowance system; John Maurice Clark writes on the government control of industry, while Harry F. Ward contributes several pages on some strategic measures for creating a new economic order. The book is indeed a treasure-house of advanced thoughts relating to the ideals of a possible future economic order.

M. J. V.

500 CRIMINAL CAREERS. By SHELDON GLUECK and ELEANOR T. GLUECK. A. A. Knopf, New York, 1930, pp. 365.

Reformatories have long claimed a high percentage of reforms and successes, in some cases as great as 80 per cent. The Gluecks, however, became convinced of the unreliability of the few follow-up studies supporting such conclusions, and at a time when society at large is sensitized to the subject of penal reform, throw new light on old, but increasingly pertinent questions. What percentage of the former inmates of our prisons become law-abiding citizens? How many return to a life of crime and vice? What effect on the character and outlook does a penal institution bring about? Is prison a deterrent?

The book is based upon data obtained from a careful investigation of the life histories of 510 men who left the Massachusetts Reformatory during the years 1911-1922, an ensuing five year post-parole test period permitting the authors to gauge the probable permanence of the reformation or to establish reversion to criminality. The important fact they establish is that 90 per cent *were not reformed* five to fifteen years later, but went right on committing crimes after their discharge. Such evidence can only be damning for the reformatory system in general coming as it does from one of the very best institutions of its kind.

One clue is afforded by the characterization of the average inmate of the reformatory insofar as 510 men may be taken as a fair sample. He is already a criminal and comes from a large, illiterate, impoverished family containing other criminals. In 60 per cent of the cases his home is a broken one. He is American born of foreign parentage

and is chiefly a thief by occupation, his delinquencies beginning by his sixteenth year. He had been arrested 3-4 times before being sent to the reformatory. In 20 per cent of the cases he is feeble-minded. Usually stays 12-15 months in the institution but masters no trade while there. After leaving on parole, he becomes a failure in 50 per cent of the cases so far as the parole officer can tell, while after finishing his parole, the records show that he is still a lazy, wandering, drunken fellow. Only in one-third of the cases does he go to work at any trade learned by him in the reformatory. Such work as he does is poor, although not quite so poor as it was before he entered the institution. His criminality is not quite so steady nor so frequent as it was before his reform. However, neither the latter slightly encouraging facts nor others cited of an apparently extenuatory nature, will prevent the eugenicist from regarding individuals of his type as being the unfortunate victims of a bad heredity, who in most cases have been unable to markedly profit by an environment which the majority of the inmates confessed to have been good.

It would seem possible to improve the existing system in reformatories to a certain extent. Thus it is fairly probable that with better psychiatric facilities a larger proportion of feeble-minded individuals would be found among the inmates—perhaps as much as 30-40 per cent. Such should be treated as feeble-minded which ought to remove them from the scope of the “reformatory.” The real work of the latter would seem to be with the 20 per cent more or less who did not “act badly” after the expiration of their parole, but the problem would be to recognize them in advance. All will agree that much criticism is due to the church for its failure in constructive missionary work during the parole period and to community and private social welfare agencies for their indifference during that time to the possibilities of constructive work with the prisoners and their families. Here is society’s chance to reclaim the individual of whom it or the environment may have made a criminal. The latter unquestionably should have the benefit of the doubt until psychiatric study shows that his failure in society is due to congenital causes. An important advance in this connection is brought out in the chapter on predictability in the administration of criminal justice. In conclusion it is felt that the authors have made a very notable initiation of a much needed line of research, and one which has avoided those inaccuracies of criminal data and social information which tended to have misled social workers in the past.

N. M. G.

OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY. By JOHN L. GILLIN and FRANK W. BLACKMAR. Third Edition. The Macmillan Co., 1930, pp. x+692.

This well-known and widely used text has been brought to date through a careful revision. First published in 1915 it was the outcome of a smaller book conceived several years earlier by Dr. Blackmar. One of its wearing qualities has been its straightforward descriptive non-technical style. Another point of strength is the fact that it has had "no hobbies to ride, no one system to promote."

The new edition omits the chapters on methods of social investigation of the preceding edition, changes the titles of a number of chapters, brings the contents of each chapter in line with current developments, and adds three new chapters: one on "Culture and Social Evolution," one on "Population and Race"; and another on "Social Reconstruction." The two chapters on the state have been consolidated into one.

Progress is found in three fields: the rise of machinery, the growth of political machinery and legal regulation, and the growth of science. Obstacles to progress are cited, such as: immense aggregates of population, an immense hangover of respect for tradition and custom, commercialization, intrenchment of vested interests, the survival of class and group prejudices. Hopeful possibilities of further progress are: increased social mobility, new scientific methods of arriving at facts, the growing respect for science, a growing educational system, increasing dissemination of information, a growing sense of social relationships and responsibilities. The new edition is destined to carry forward the usefulness of its predecessors and to give to the next generations a constructive picture of human civilization.

E. S. B.

BOLETIN DEL INSTITUTO INTERNACIONAL AMERICANO DE PROTECCION A LA INFANCIA, by Dr. LUIS MORQUINO, Director, Montevideo (Uruguay). Vol. III, No. 3, Jan., 1930, pp. 85-621.

The Bulletin is a review of the work that is being accomplished and of the plans that are being formulated for the protection and care of the child in South America. Dr. Felipe Ferrer Begnon, chief of the centers for Infant Hygiene in the Republic of Mexico, writes enthusiastically of their plans for the care of the child in Mexico. Their aim is for the complete betterment of society through the

careful education and care of the child. The program is very suggestive of the new idealism which is arising in our neighboring republic. In the report from Chile by Luis del Solar R, data are presented which indicate that considerable progress has been made already for child betterment in Chile. Importance is given to the part played by the "social visitor" in the public school. Her efforts along with those of the physician are considered to be indispensable for the cultural and intellectual development of Chilean youth. The findings of Dr. Theo. A. Tonina of Buenos Aires on the work of the "open-air school" are illuminating. This is an important step taken in that large city for the protection and development of children living in congested districts.

The Bulletin is valuable to the student of child welfare in America. It indicates the new advances which are being made along with the latest technique in child care among the most progressive countries in Spanish-speaking America. Each report is followed by a brief review both in French and English. Section VI refers to the Pan-American Congress of the Child to be held in Lima, Peru, July 4-11, 1930.

L. D. G.

TEN THOUSAND SMALL LOANS. By LOUIS N. ROBINSON and MAUDE E. STEARNS New York, Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 159.

This investigation covers 10,000 small loans made in 109 cities in 17 different states. In nearly all cases these loans were made under the Uniform Small Loan law or some similar statute. The report estimates that 1,500,000 loans were made in 1929 in the states having such laws and that the volume of business aggregated \$500,000,000.

In this study a special attempt is made to obtain information about the borrowers. Facts were gathered in respect to their ages, marital status, race, occupations, wages, indebtedness, ownership of homes, and other important social and economic conditions. A special chapter deals with "The Loan." In this we learn that the most frequent loan was \$100, that \$50 came next and the average loan amounted to about \$120. The borrowers were largely married couples of American birth and the modal weekly income was from \$30 to \$40. Eight per cent were unemployed at the time the loan was made.

The report contains 71 statistical tables and is clearly an intensive study of this type of borrower.

G. B. M.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE MACHINE AGE. By ARTHUR BRUCE ANTHONY. University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles, 1930, pp. 82.

In this monograph, Professor Anthony stimulates new interest in economic problems which seem to have grown out of the technique of machine production. He discusses with rare insight the changes which have been caused by concentration and centralization in modern industry, with the consequent recurring industrial depression, waste of natural resources, inequality in the distribution of wealth, various social cleavages, international rivalries and institutional conflicts and maladjustments. Although the stress is economic, the social and political aspects receive due attention. The author suggests that there might be three divergent lines of possible economic development in the future, viz.: the socialization of industry, the relaxation of the public regulation of industry, or thirdly, a golden mean between the two extremes of socialism and laissez faire. The latter might be expressed as government regulation, in the public interest, of privately owned and operated means of production and distribution. Furthermore, it is probable that in the majority of cases the economic interest of the community is best served by a privately owned and operated industry subject to scientific, efficient public regulation. Although a surprising amount of thought-provoking material is found within these relatively few pages, the engaging style and exposition of the author make the monograph attractive.

J. E. N.

THE EVOLUTION OF WAR—A STUDY OF ITS ROLE IN EARLY SOCIETIES. By MAURICE R. DAVIE. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1929, pp. x+391.

Here we have another valuable contribution from the Sumnerian school of anthropology and ethnology. Using the library method of research the author has brought together a great mass of material on the origin and development of primitive and barbarian warfare, and summarized it into a form which is compact, interesting, and readable.

The book, as stated in the Preface, is "designed for the general reader as well as for the special student"; but it is probable that it will be of greatest service as a source book. For such a purpose the placing of all footnotes at the end of the book, as has been done, instead of at the bottom of each page, will prove to be an aggravating arrangement for the researcher.

The study has grown out of a doctor's dissertation written in Yale. It is conservative and scholarly on the whole, but a few sweeping generalizations of a doubtful nature have crept in. The following statement (p. 119) will serve as an example: "The evangelization of the world has usually been undertaken by the sword."

More than half of the book deals with certain causes of war, such as: location, cannibalism, land and booty, women, religion, blood revenge, human sacrifice, head hunting, glory, and ethnocentrism. The state is treated as a result of war. Two chapters are devoted to evidences of the beginning of the peace movement in early times. The last chapter contains interesting lists of beneficial and deleterious effects of war. Later comes a large section given over to appendices containing useful data on various phases of early warfare.

The whole tenor of the book is optimistic relative to the solution of the problem of war. In his conclusion (p. 233) the author states: "The tendency throughout the ages has definitely been toward the development of peaceful methods of settling disputes, especially within the group. . . . The question whether war will ever cease depends, in the last analysis, on whether the means developed for adjudicating internal differences can be extended to the intergroup relation, with the result that peace shall prevail and war become an anachronism."

R. M. Y.

SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY PROBLEMS OF OKLAHOMA.

By JENNINGS J. RHYNE. Cooperative Publishing Co., Guthrie, Oklahoma, 1929, pp. 229.

A new departure is represented by this work. A textbook has been prepared dealing with regional problems. The definite area that is treated is Oklahoma; the topics covered include: historical background, population composition, the Indian, the Negro, the rural community, the family, the school, the church, industry, housing, poverty, mental disease, crime, and play, and indices of social telesis. The point of view is that of the sociologist. Problems and readings are given at the close of each chapter, which are crammed with interesting facts. An objective and dispassionable viewpoint is maintained. The brief excerpts from case studies which are introduced from chapter to chapter are especially helpful. The documentation is carefully done. The facts presented indicate that Oklahoma on the whole would rank on a higher level in the number and seriousness of its social and community problems, that is, it is much better off than many other states.

E. S. B.

COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP. By WALTER BURR. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1929, pp. x+304.

The material in this book is designed largely for leaders of rural groups but may be utilized with profit by leaders of urban groups. Each chapter contains "readings" in addition to a discussion of the topic. The discussions are largely of a practical nature based on the author's own personal experience in a rural community and the experiences of other local leaders.

The author maintains at the outset that "the local leader must get a world vision," as well as "to acquire a community consciousness." Slow and directed progress is better than rapid spurts. Sometimes a leader must use indirect methods to get things done. It requires special understanding to lead backward groups. The training of followers is essential to all successful leadership, and there should be cooperation among the various leaders of the community. The treatment of the characteristics and qualifications of leaders leaves something to be desired, particularly in comprehensiveness and organization. The entire book, while replete with practical suggestions for community leaders, lacks in organization of material and systematic treatment.

M. H. N.

THE U.S. LOOKS AT THE CHURCHES. By C. LUTHER FRY. Institute of Social and Religious Research, New York, 1930, pp. ix+183.

This volume presents in a summary form the important conclusions about American churches which were drawn from a study of the significant data collected by the *Federal Census of Religious Bodies*. It is the best available summary for practical use.

There are 212 separate denominations having 232,000 churches and 44,380,000 members over 13 years of age. The value of church edifices alone is \$3,800,000,000 and the total expenditure of local churches amounts to \$817,000,000. Fifty-five per cent of those over 13 years of age are enrolled as church members. Of the total members, 30 per cent are Roman Catholic, 17.7 per cent Baptists, 16.3 per cent Methodist Episcopal, 6.4 per cent Lutheran, 5.6 per cent Presbyterian, 15.5 per cent other Protestants, 6.6 per cent Jewish, and 1.9 per cent other non-Protestants. The eastern states have the largest number of churches in proportion to the population, and the southwestern states have the lowest rate. For the United States as a whole there is a church for every 344 inhabitants over 13 years of age.

M. H. N.

SAINT AUGUSTINE. By GIOVANNI PAPINI. Translated by Mary Prichard Agnetti. Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1930. This biography of the greatest theologian, philosopher, and writer of his time is truly the story of a soul rather than of a life, but the soul is glimpsed through life experiences, thought, theology, mysticism, and an artistic and poetic nature. Augustine is regarded as the outstanding metaphysician of antiquity and the first modern psychologist. It is because of the latter that we have in his *Confessions* the most able self-analysis of the divided-self that is known in literature. Without undue stress, but honestly, Papini presents the essentials to understand this duality of nature, ascribing what is good in his heritage to his wonderful mother, Monica, and what is bad, to his father. The Numidian social and other environmental factors are not overlooked in appraisal of Augustine as boy, youth, and man. Not disparagement, but finer appreciation of the victory and its significance, results from Papini's delineation of Augustine's rise from the meanness and mire of carnal sensuality to a plane of high and noble living. When one realizes that he was so essentially human and suffered this violent struggle for intellectual and spiritual mastery over the physical and base, one feels the more, with Papini, both affection and reverence for Augustine as a Saint. And noteworthy, Saint Augustine teaches us that conversion is not deprivation in so far as worldly temptations are concerned, but sublimation. But the book is far more than a sketch of the libido which runs through life. In fact, his travels, his contacts with great men of his time, the influence of institutions and traditions, are shown as doing their part in molding a great soul. Of primary interest, of course, is the church life of his day. Changing from Manichaeism and Zoroastrian influence, also from Neo-Platonism to conversion and confession of Catholic Christianity, Augustine becomes priest and bishop, and the outstanding defender of the Catholic Church against heretics and sects. Papini calls to attention and evaluates several of Augustine's most important works, notably *The City of God*. A chronology of Augustine's life and works, and a carefully selected bibliography, round out the work. Since the year 1930 is the fifteenth centenary of the death of Saint Augustine, Papini's book serves as a tribute to one for whom death does not exist. J. E. N.

THE ALIEN IN OUR MIDST. Edited by MADISON GRANT and C. S. DAVISON. Galton Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930. Strong arguments are advanced against the immigrants. Words of warning have been culled from distinguished Americans, such as: Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, and Patrick Henry. Living writers also contribute to this symposium, for example: Albert Johnson, Charles B. Davenport, E. M. East, V. S. McClatchy, H. F. Osborn, and Lothrop Stoddard. A plea is made against "selling our birthright for a mess of pottage." The weakness of the book is that excerpts have been selected to show only one side of the case. E. S. B.

OUTDOOR RECREATION LEGISLATION AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS. By ANDREW G. TRUXALL, Columbia University Press, New York, 1929, pp. 218. The study is divided into two parts. The first half is devoted to a summary of American legislation for public outdoor recreation from 1915 to 1927 inclusive. Since only two states and a few municipalities had such legislation prior to 1915, this volume gives an almost complete resumé of recreation legislation. The second half of the study is in the nature of a scientific exploration, dealing with the association between recreation areas and juvenile delinquency in Manhattan, 1920. M. H. N.

OUR CITIES TODAY AND TOMORROW: A SURVEY OF PLANNING AND ZONING PROGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES. By THEODORE K. HUBBARD and HENRY V. HUBBARD. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1929, pp. 389. This survey and analysis of city planning and zoning progress in the United States was made possible by a grant from the Milton Fund for Research of Harvard University. It represents a bird's-eye view of the recent developments in city planning. Extensive concrete material has been included, a large portion of which was obtained by means of field studies. M. H. N.

THE EVOLUTION OF EARTH AND MAN. Edited by GEORGE A. BAITSSELL.

Yale University Press, 1929, pp. xv+476. Twelve giant scholars in as many different fields have contributed to this volume. All are Yale University professors excepting G. H. Parker of Harvard and E. G. Conklin of Princeton, who wrote on "The Evolution of the Nervous System of Man" and "The Trend of Evolution," respectively. Other contributors and their topics are: James R. Angell (The Evolution of Intelligence), Ellsworth Huntington (Climate and the Evolution of Civilization), A. G. Keller (Societal Evolution), G. G. MacCurdy (Cultural Evolution). The volume begins with the origin of the earth and ends with the mechanism of evolution. The materials aim to be factual rather than controversial, and cover a field so broad that no one person could have written them. The sum total effect is one of orderly progress. President Angell concludes that "the evolution of intelligence may be considered as close to its beginnings rather than in any sense drawing near to its close." Ellsworth Huntington concludes that human progress depends upon inherent mental capacity, material resources, and human energy. A. G. Keller regrets that "nowhere is real knowledge and science so little in intelligent demand as in the societal domain."

E. S. B.

AN ADVENTURE IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. By WALTER S. ATHEARN.

The Century Co., New York, 1930. Dean Athearn has given a detailed report concerning the Boston University School of Religious Education and Social Service, which deals with three major ideals: the personalistic and idealistic interpretation of the objectives of religious education; the democratization of religious education; the securing of research facilities for religious education. The book has special value for religious education administrators.

INSTITUTIONAL CARE AND PLACING-OUT. By ELIAS L. TROTZKEY, Marks

Nathan Jewish Orphan Home, Chicago, 1930, pp. xx+120. Here is a practical volume based on concrete experiences, with special reference to "the claims put forth on behalf of boarding-out." Boarding out is compared with institutional care and the conclusion reached that the institution has a major place in dependent child care. Attention is also given to community organization with respect to child care.

RESEARCH AND THESIS WRITING. By JOHN C. ALMACK. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1930.

The first chapters discuss the scientific method, the generalizing process, normative, experimental, and historical methods, the mechanics of thesis writing, and standards of research. Selected references are given at the end of each chapter. The treatment is concrete and practical; a textbook style is maintained. An educational rather than a sociological viewpoint is presented.

THE CONQUEST OF THOUGHT BY INVENTION. By H. STOFFORD HATFIELD.

W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1929, pp. 80. The increasing mechanization of human society is portrayed. People will become completely mechanized until "the white races can and will settle down to live in a manner closely analogous to that of other routinized organisms such as ants and bees."

SOCIOLOGY AND SIN. By P. SARGENT FLORENCE. W. W. Norton & Co., New

York, 1929, pp. 98. The author contends that sociologists who have a passion for social uplift and morality have prevented themselves from seeing humanity as it is. He pleads consequently for a scientific sociology.

THE FUTURE OF THE EARTH. By H. JEFFREYS. W. W. Norton & Co., New

York, 1929, pp. 79. The history of the earth is described to the time when the oceans will freeze at the equator.

THE DEEPER MEANING OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION. By EUGEN MATTHIAS

(Munich), translated by C. L. Schrader. A. S. Barnes & Co., New York, 1929, pp. xii+88.

Social Research Notes

Edited by M. H. NEUMEYER

SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF CHICAGO'S LOCAL COMMUNITIES. The city of Chicago has been divided into seventy-five local communities, each a "miniature society with its own history and traditions, its own individual problems, and its own conception of the future." A mimeographed prospectus of a series of volumes on the social backgrounds of these communities has been prepared. The first volume deals with Chicago's North Side. A sample of one local community center, Northcenter, is given by way of illustration. A note is appended proposing a community research exchange.

The gathering of basic data by communities, such as has been carried on by the Local Community Research Committee of the University of Chicago, is a significant step in the direction of more adequate social control of city life. City planning, based on careful analysis of the physical basis of the city, is now well under way. Social planning, based on studies of social backgrounds, is just beginning. The work that has thus far been done represents an important pioneering effort to develop research techniques to gather and classify basic data.

Prepared by Vivien M. Palmer from Sociological Studies directed by E. W. Burgess and Vivien Palmer for the Local Community Research Committee of the University of Chicago, 1930.

ANTI-FILIPINO RACE RIOTS. A number of anti-Filipino demonstrations have occurred on the Pacific Coast within the last two years. They began in the state of Washington in 1928, followed by others at Exeter, California, in October, 1929, and at Watsonville, California, in January, 1930. Nine different classes of people were interviewed with the view of gathering first hand data concerning these race riots. Three types of antecedent events of the Watsonville riot are noted: (1) a few cases of Filipinos brought to court for various offenses, usually "reckless driving" of automobiles; (2) a set of Resolutions passed in Pajaro (adjoining Watsonville) by the Northern Monterey Chamber of Commerce charging the Filipinos with lowering wages, spreading diseases, and a few marrying white girls. These

resultions were followed by protest meetings on the part of the Filipinos. (3) A small Filipino club imported white dance hall girls and set up a taxi dance hall.

The underlying causal factors are many. The chief ones are: economic, racial, population unbalance, law and order, and leadership. Filipinos have displaced other workers and organized labor in California has fostered a movement to exclude Filipino laborers. The racial factors (color, language, customs) also aggravated the situation. The ratio of Filipino males to females coming to California is 14 to 1. Furthermore, 79.4 per cent of the Filipino immigrants are between 16 and 30 years of age. Police control was slow at the start of the riots and community leadership had not been developed to control the situation. E. S. Bogardus, *A Report made to the Ingram Institute of Social Science of San Diego*, May 15, 1930, pp. 29.

RURAL AND URBAN LIVING STANDARDS IN VIRGINIA. The uniqueness of this study consists in the attempt to consider comparatively project data gathered from both rural and urban communities. Furthermore, the samples were taken from three fairly well defined groups of families in both rural and urban areas; the "poor," the "intermediate," and the "prosperous." A total of 277 families were studied, 137 rural and 140 urban. The average annual expenditures by the rural families by groups were: "poor" \$892, "intermediate" \$1,722, and "prosperous" \$4,087. The urban groups of families spent respectively: \$977, \$1,959, and \$6,771. The various items in the budget of the various types of families were also tabulated.

In addition to the study of budgets, the social and environmental factors were noted, such as the number of children in the family, educational attainments, occupational status of the family (including the children), the various environmental factors in living standards, and the cultural and recreational activities. The city families in each group averaged a smaller number of living children than the farm groups. The level of formal education of both parents and children was higher in the city than in the country, and there was found to be a correlation between income and formal schooling. A large percentage of the children of the poor enter unskilled occupations, whereas the children of the intermediate families enter largely the semi-skilled and skilled occupations, and the children of the prosperous families enter business and the professions. "Farm families exceed in each group the corresponding city group in time spent in reading,

with poor farm families reading about as much as intermediate city families and with prosperous farm families spending over 50 per cent more time in reading than city families of the same groups. Wilson Gee and William A. Stauffer, *Monograph No. 6*, The Institute for Research of the Social Sciences, University of Virginia, 1929, pp. 132.

SOCIAL CHANGE. The third annual volume (*American Journal of Sociology*) reviews the significant developments in 1929. It contains a series of research papers on the various fields of social life undergoing change, each of which contains a record of events, together with an analysis, interpretation, appraisal, and study of the causes and interrelations of these changes. The topics treated by various writers are: population, natural resources, inventions and discoveries, production, foreign policy, labor, earnings, employment and unemployment, social and labor legislation, public health, communication, community organization, rural life, the family, crime, organized religion, race relations, education, government, status of the child, the status of women.

The changes noted cover a wide range of items, of which only a few can be given here. There is an important downward trend in the true natural increase of the population (especially whites) in all regions of the United States except the South, caused partly by the passing of foreign-born and the rural-urban migration, resulting in a speeding up of the shift of age composition, and necessitating a series of adjustments. The United States government, particularly the Hoover administration, is assuming a more aggressive foreign policy, with a greater emphasis on mutual agreements, yet avoiding European commitments which might imply a duty to use force. The southern textile strike situation stirred the country which led to a general organizing campaign of labor. In 1929 the real earnings in manufacturing increased 1 per cent, the year being characterized by a high level of factory employment and payrolls, except for the slump during the late fall which caused a sudden increase of unemployment. The Public Welfare Law in New York and the Jones Law to promote better enforcement of the National Prohibition Acts were among the most significant pieces of social legislation during the year. In the field of communication, the most significant developments were: a marked trend toward integration of the various forms of communication and transportation, the victory of sound pictures over the silent drama, extensive advertising over the radio,

and Byrd's successful South Polar Expedition. The increased disintegration of communal loyalties, the strengthening of fraternal orders, and the increase in super or non-communal organizations represent significant trends in community organization. The six prison riots during the past year focused public attention upon penal problems, intensified the efforts to study crime and penal institutions, and resulted in new or proposed legislation. Organized religion has made steady advances, with 55 per cent of the people listed on the membership rolls of the churches. No changes of any magnitude in the status of the race problem in the United States occurred during 1929. *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1930.

Southern California

Dr. John L. Gillin of the University of Wisconsin, a visiting professor at the University of Southern California during the Summer Session, addressed the Alpha Kappa Delta society July 11th on "Adventures in Penology." He made a special study of the methods of training criminals during his recent trip around the world. Japan, China, Philippine Islands, India, Ceylon, England, and Belgium furnished especially interesting materials. In Japan Dr. Gillin found an excellent method of classifying prisoners (isolating the young from the old, the first offenders from the repeaters, and so forth) and one of the most complete and well operated training schools for prison officials to be found in the world.

The Philippine Islands possess a remarkably successful prison colony on a 105,000-acre island where two thousand selected prisoners are being cared for by twenty-eight officers, one-half of whom are ex-convicts. The prisoners are given great freedom; some are permitted to go on long fishing trips in power boats in which they could make their escape, but no prisoners have escaped in five years. Moreover, when they are released they become good citizens. India is trying a criminal settlement plan to solve the problem of handling a million and a half professional criminals.

England has undergone radical changes in her criminal policies. She has one of the best classification systems in the world.

International Notes

THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY, which when first announced to the world was hailed by peace societies as a betrayal of the interests of peace, has proven to be sufficiently strong to call forth a vigorous protest from militarists in the countries involved. In Japan, militaristic interests made a test of their strength in demanding that the treaty not be signed. When the militarists lost their case, Admiral Kato, chief of the Naval General Staff and member of the Supreme War Council, resigned. The Vice Minister of the Navy and the Assistant Chief of the General staff also lost their seats in the battle. The net result is claimed by some to be a great gain for freedom from the power of militarism in Japan. While the treaty was finally ratified in the United States congress, it was only after an extended and heated debate. Since this treaty is but a mild gesture toward disarmament, the opposition with which it has met indicates that the world has far yet to go to break its militaristic bonds.

35,127,398 AUTOMOBILES—one to every 55 persons on earth—are now officially registered in the various countries of the world, according to a report given out by C. F. Baldwin, assistant chief, automotive division, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, and published in the *Christian Science Monitor*. Of the total, the United States owns over 26 millions, one to every 4.5 persons, while the rest of the world possesses one automobile for every 216. The Sultanate of Oman, in Southern Arabia and Bermuda are tied for the last place with 10 automobiles each. This spreading network of cars, according to Mr. Baldwin, "is making necessary the building of better roads, and enabling the peoples of the world to meet and know each other."

THE RAPID IMPROVEMENT of means of communication continues the process of destroying the old world order at the same time it is creating the basis for the development of an international consciousness. On August 1, the new British dirigible, R-100, completed its epoch-making trans-Atlantic flight. According to the *Los Angeles Evening Herald*, "the voyage of the R-100, a veritable 'flying hotel' with 39 sleeping cabins and other luxurious accommodations for 100 passengers, is expected to be the forerunner of a regular dirigible travel service between Britain and the dominion."

TRouble in EGYPT is but another indication of discontent with British rule which extends now to Malta, to India, to Palestine, to Egypt, according to the *Outlook and Independent*. Though the British protectorate in Egypt was officially abolished in 1922, 12,000 British troops have continued to remain on Egyptian soil ever since. In August, 1929, a new treaty was drafted providing that all British troops be transferred from Cairo, Alexandria, and other points to the banks of the Suez Canal, and giving Egypt a freer hand to govern herself. Last May, Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafdists (Nationalists) and then Prime Minister, went to London to complete this treaty. The British government, however, refused to make all concessions asked by the Egyptian leader and he ended negotiations by returning home. Though hailed as a hero, he soon incurred the antagonism of King Faud by asking for a law forbidding any minister to dissolve parliament. Because the king refused his request, Nahas resigned and has been campaigning vigorously ever since in an attempt to strengthen the Nationalist cause. A series of Nationalist riots have resulted, the worst of which was at Alexandria on July 15 when 20 persons were killed and hundreds injured. "The agitation of the Nationalists against (King) Faud is but an incident in their larger campaign for greater independence from British supervision."

NEW YORK CITY is turning communistic, according to the *Rote Fahne*, the official daily of Germany's Communist Party, which is quoted in the *Reader's Digest*. When the Communist demonstration was held in Union Square on March 7, the *New York Times* published an estimate of the number of participants as 2,000 Communists with 35,000 on-lookers. The *Herald-Tribune* sets the total at 40,000, while the *World* agrees with the *Times*. The *Rote Fahne*, however, reported that "about half a million workers participated in the demonstration in New York. Over 120,000 workers marched in close ranks. Hundreds of thousands filled Union Square. An hour before the time set for the demonstration the gigantic Square was occupied by 100,000 demonstrators, as estimated by the bourgeois press. . . . In front of the City Hall, the demonstrators were met by an army of 25,000 police, in full fighting military array. . . . An embittered man-to-man fight ensued and lasted late into the evening. . . . The bourgeois press asserts: 'Never before has New York lived through such a battle.' " This is a good example of how propagandists tend to distort facts.

THE CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY plans to hold its second annual meeting at Nanking in February, 1931, at which meeting the central theme will be population problems. This new sociological society was organized at Shanghai last February with about one hundred people from all over China present. Dr. P. W. Sun, National Central University, was elected president; Dr. Leonard Hsu, Yenching University (a contributing editor to this journal), was elected vice-president. The society proposes to organize the Chinese sociological world for the study of sociological theories, social problems, and the principles of social administration. The society plans to issue a quarterly journal.

AIR-MAIL SERVICE, which has become familiar to us in the United States, is rapidly spreading around the world. "The United States Post Office Department now has in operation seven foreign air-mail services—most of them operating to Latin-American points," according to the *Pan-Pacific Progress*. In some cases, anywhere from four days to two weeks can be saved in the delivery of mail in this way. Plans are now being worked out for the extension of air-mail service to all the important South American trade centers. . . . Europe is covered with a network of air-mail services . . . connecting most of the European trade centers as well as the north and west coasts of Africa."

C. D. W.

Social Fiction Notes

DOCTOR SEROCOLD. By HELEN ASHTON. Doubleday, Doran and Company, New York, 1930, pp. 305.

Both from the socio-psychological and the ecological approaches, this new novel brings to the reader a study, portent with charm, of the occupational attitude of an English village physician. Through the eyes of Dr. Serocold, a survey of the personalities of the village is presented, and it is in this that the significance for social psychology is registered. Here the social situations are pictured as glimpsed through the eye-glasses colored by the past experiences of the physician. The author is to be heartily commended for her most skillful depiction of the manner in which the occupational attitude tints and shades the rays emanating from the social situations. Undoubtedly her success in this direction has been largely conditioned by her actual experiences as the wife of a physician.

Again, she is eminently successful in her portrayal of the role of suggestion in the behavior of the doctor. Indeed, I know of no novel which could be used better to supplement the theoretical accounts of suggestion as found in any of our present-day social psychological treatises. The doctor's production of verbalizations is keenly revealed, and the analysis of those verbalizations in actual interaction with those of other personalities constitutes a bright spot in the novel. The circumscribed village life, conditioning ever the attitudes, marks the ecological approach. The whole novel is admirably written, and the twenty-four hour glimpse of the mind of the physician should be a real clinical treat for the sociologically-minded student.

M. J. V.

Social Photoplay Notes

WILL ROGERS, by virtue of a droll humor aptly applied to situations of public interest, has become more than a columnist. He is America's "Court Jester," calling attention to, and ridiculing shams and shiboleths—ever without offense, for his wit is unarming.

The entrance of Rogers into motion pictures has further enhanced his position. He presents a naturalness of manner, a freedom from artificiality that blends well with his droll humor. On the screen he is the person we all want to be at times; the individual in open rebellion against trivial and foolish conventionalities.

His recent picture, *So This Is London*, makes race prejudice the basis of the entertainment. In the course of the picture some of the silly superficial grounds upon which we are prone to rest our beliefs and opinions of foreign peoples are held up and ridiculed. Rogers is an American merchant forced by business to visit England. To him an Englishman is the epitome of all that is "highbrow"; while to the Englishman that he visits, an American is the same for all that is plebian. The action centers about the meeting of these two with their dual misconceptions resultant of hearsay and incomplete knowledge. Eventually the two gentlemen become fast friends as face to face contacts create bonds of sympathetic understanding. Will Rogers finally sums up the story when he says that the typical native is too busy to travel thus leaving it to the gadding tourist to represent the country.

So This Is London is splendid entertainment in every way, and only in one respect does it fall down as a creator of friendly feeling toward strange peoples. The strangeness of English customs is made the basis of many a humorous quip, giving a distorted and belittled picture of the Englishman and an impression of American superiority. But probably the geniality of the whole overcomes most of the harmful effect.

More pictures featuring Will Rogers are forthcoming and this is as it should be, for he has raised comedy to a higher plane. The jokes in most comedies arise out of situations that in life never exist. By these we are amused for the moment and that is all. Rogers, on the other hand, draws upon actual life situations, the ordering of a meal, an election campaign, the procuring of a passport; things in which we ordinarily participate in a serious or a bored manner. He takes these normally drab events and makes them colorful.

G. D. N.

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH



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(November-December, 1930, and later)

Human Relationships and Structures.....	LEOPOLD VON WIESE
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Dominance as a Culture Concept.....	MAPHEUS SMITH
Immigration from Turkey.....	LELAND J. GORDON

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(July-August, 1930)

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A Study of Widowhood.....	MARY A. FRITZ
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